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NOTES
TIME LIMITS ON ARBITRABILITY OF SECURITIES
INDUSTRY DISPUTES UNDER THE ARBITRATION
RULES OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The arbitration of security industry disputes has displaced
litigation as the adjudication method of choice.' With a grow-
ing number of securities-related disputes submitted to arbitra-
tion, the number of legal problems created by arbitration has
grown accordingly.2 These arbitration problems range from the
procedural aspects of the arbitration process to its compatibili-
ty with areas of substantive law.
One of the most contested issues in securities arbitration
involves application of the six-year time-bar provisions of the
Code of Arbitration Procedure. Each of the major self-regula-
tory organizations ("SRO")-the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers ("NASD"), the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"), and the American Stock Exchange--have adopted
I See ShearsonlAmerican Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1957)
('The suitability of arbitration as a means of exploring Exchange Act rights is
evident .... ."). Securities industry arbitration has been endorsed by the Supreme
Court and welcomed by Wall Street: 'The industry figured that dealing with such
spats out of court would be quicker and cheaper-and reduce the possibility of as-
tronomical awards by jurors sympathetic to individual investors. Marilyn B. Cane
& Howard S. Weinstein, Securities Arbitration Update 1993-1994, in 13TH ANNUAL
So. FED. SEC. INST. 387 at 391 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Feb. 24, 1994)
[hereinafter "Arbitration Update"].
2 Securities arbitration has caught the eye of the academic community. After
the Supreme Courts decision in ShearsonlAmercan Express v. Mcdahon, 482 US.
220 (1987), the Index to Legal Periodicals, LI compiled a new section under the
heading Securities Arbitration. In 1990-91, when this section first appeared, it had
16 entries.
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these provisions.3 Modeled after the time-limit rule of the Uni-
form Arbitration Act proposed by the Securities Industry Con-
ference on Arbitration, these provisions of each self-regulatory
organization bar those claims arising from an event that oc-
curred more than six years before the filing of the arbitration
claims. 4 Short and simple at first glance, these provisions have
created a great deal of controversy over their interpretation.'
The controversy flows from the unusual nature of these
limitation periods. Unlike conventional statutes of limitations
that attach to a claim by operation of law, arbitration time-
bars apply to a claim as all other arbitration procedural rules
do: by incorporation in the arbitration agreement between
parties. The unconventional origin of such arrangements, in
comparison with statutory time-limitations, has caused courts
to disagree over how to define their character. Some courts
consider the time-bars to be procedural defenses subject to an
arbitral disposition.6 Other Courts perceive these six-year peri-
ods as substantive eligibility requirements that preclude a
claim from submission to an arbitration forum altogether and
therefore require a judicial determination
' The American Arbitration Association's independent arbitration forum,
("AAA'), does not have any specific time limitations on the submission of a claim
to arbitration. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION
RULES (1993).
These rules all provide:
No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission under
this Code where six (6) years shall have elapsed from the occurrence or
event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or controversy. This section
shall not extend applicable statutes of limitations, nor shall it apply to
any case which is directed to arbitration by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.
NASD C.A.P. R. 15 (present version), NASD MANUAL (CCH) q 3715; NYSE Ar-
bitration Rules, R. 606, NYSE GUIDE (CCH) % 2606; AmEx Arbitration Rules R.
605, AmEx GUIDE (CCHI) % 9544; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSmB")
R. G-35, Section 6(a), MSRB MANUAL (CCII) J 3671, at 5404 (1994).
The federal circuit courts are split over whether time-bars are procedural or
substantive in nature what entity decides the timeliness of claims. The Second,
Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits have concluded
that arbitrators rather than courts should decide the issue. The Third, Sixth and
Seventh Circuits have come to the opposite conclusion. See Wylie v. Investment
Mgmt. & Research, Inc., 629 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The judi-
cial treatment of the arbitration time-bars is discussed in considerable detail infra
part Ii
6 See infra notes 115-53 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 154-95 and accompanying text.
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To secure some uniformity and reduce the number of dis-
putes over the time-bars, the NASD first proposed to amend its
time limitations provision in 1993.8 The proposal delegates the
final determination of eligibility to the NASD's Director of
Arbitration.9 To ensure the finality of the director's determina-
tion, NASD members who do not follow it ran the risk of
sanctions, but not investors. 0 Because the Code of Arbitration
Procedure is incorporated in the arbitration clause of a con-
tract, the NASD asserts that parties to a contract ultimately
are bound by this provision, which prohibits resort to the
courts or other forums in case of an unfavorable disposition.1
This Note examines the arbitration time-bars and their
treatment by various courts and considers the effects of adopt-
ing the NASD proposal. Part I reviews the background of time-
bars and provides a history of securities arbitration that ex-
plains how the industry has changed its attitude toward arbi-
tration. Part I also discusses the important role the time-bar
provisions play considering the almost mandatory nature of
securities arbitration. This discussion demonstrates how the
courts' deference to arbitrators' decisions allows the time-bars
to defeat an otherwise valid claim. Further, this Part describes
the types of limitations periods and how federal equitable
doctrines affect the length of these periods, including how ar-
bitration time-bars may conflict with other statutes of limita-
tions.
Next, Part TT discusses SROs' time-bar provisions and the
judicial treatment of these provisions. The majority of courts
perceive the time-bars as procedural limitations defenses to be
decided by arbitrators rather than by courts. Part II argues,
however, that the minority view, which considers time-bars to
be eligibility or jurisdictional requirements subject to judicial
determination, is more in accord with the Federal Arbitration
Act and with Supreme Court precedent. It also proposes a
more appropriate model for the determination of the timeliness
of arbitration.
1 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 33108, 1993 WNL 441275 (Oct. 26, 1993)
[hereinafter "First Proposal"]; SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34,442, 59 Fed. Reg.
39,373 (Aug. 2, 1994) [hereinafter "Second Proposal].
Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,373.
'" Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,373.
n Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,374.
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Finally, Part III reviews the changes the NASD has pro-
posed for its time-bar rule. It argues that the proposal suffers
from two major drawbacks: first, the NASD's Director of Arbi-
tration is not the best possible authority to determine this
complex legal issue; and second, the amended rule does not
close all the loopholes that enable parties to relitigate this is-
sue. This Note concludes that the question of whether a claim
is time-eligible for arbitration should be decided by courts
through summary proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND: THE GENEALOGY OF TIME-BARS
The time-bar provisions in the SROs' Code of Arbitration
Procedure are significant for two reasons. First, in most in-
stances arbitration of securities claims is mandatory'2 by way
of an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. As such, arbitration
may be the only available procedure by which a claimant can
recover for an alleged wrong. That is, if there is a valid arbi-
tration agreement and the claim is ruled ineligible for arbitra-
tion, courts usually consider a claim barred from litigation.
Second, in addition to federal and state statutes of limitations,
the time-bar provisions further limit a cause of action. Secu-
rities arbitration encompasses a variety of causes of action gov-
erned by time limits of different length. The six-year period at
times may shorten the statute of limitations that controls a
claim presented to arbitration. As a result, the six-year time-
bars may preclude a claim from arbitration and litigation that
otherwise would be allowed by the statute of limitations gov-
erning the underlying legal claims.
A. Arbitration in the Securities Industry
Arbitration has had a long history in the securities indus-
try. As early as 1872, the NYSE initiated a program to arbi-
trate disputes between members and non-members."3 Never-
' For example, Article VII, section 1 of the Constitution of the American
Stock Exchange provides: "Members ... shall arbitrate all controversies...
among themselves or between them and their customers .... " American Stock
Exchange Guide (CCH) q 9062 (emphasis added).
' David A. Lipton, Broker-Dealer Regulation, 15 SEC. L. SERIES 4-2, § 4.01[1]
(1988).
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theless, until well into the 1980s, the enforceability of agree-
ments to arbitrate securities disputes was questionable, and
thus undermined the legitimacy of securities arbitration."
Judicial hostility to all kinds of arbitration initially came
to the United States as part of English common law heritage.
Although British courts before the Companies Act of 1900 "
honored stipulations that bound purchasers to waive the statu-
tory liabilities-as long as the stipulations were not too
"tricky' 6 -they "traditionally considered irrevocable arbitra-
tion agreements as 'ousting the court of jurisdiction,' and re-
fused to enforce such agreements for this reason."17 Yet this
hostility did not fit the industrialization-driven and business-
oriented societal model of twentieth-century America. 8 In
1925, Congress, "profit[ing] from English experience," 9 enact-
ed the Federal Arbitration Act." The Arbitration Act was de-
signed to reverse generations of judicial hostility toward arbi-
tration clauses in contracts.2 For example, section 2 of the
Act provided that an agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable." The Act reflected a liberal fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration agreements.2
Although the Federal Arbitration Act opened the doors for
arbitration, its application to the securities industry was
"' See, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (refusing to enforce an agreement
to arbitrate in connection with § 12(2) of the Securities Act), overruled on different
grounds by Rodriguez DeQuijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 US. 277
(1989).
Companies Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. cl. 48 (Eng.).
16 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, X SECURITIES REGULATION 4552 (3d ed. 1993)
(quoting Greenwood v. Leather Shod Wheel Co., 1900-01 ch. 421 (C..)).
17 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974) (enforcing an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute arising out of the sale of business before the
International Chambers of Commerce in Paris).
Is As U.S. Senator Sterling had noted in the report accompanying S. 1005,
which later became the Federal Arbitration Act, "[t]he settlement of disputes by
arbitration appeals to big business and little business alike, to corporate interests
as well as to individuals." S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924).
19 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 4554.
" 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & II Supp. 1990).
21 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-21 & 220 n.6
(1985) (enforcing an arbitration agreement in connection with the purchase of secu-
rities); see also S. REP. No. 536, supra note 18, at 2.
2 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
1 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (if it is necessary to enforce an arbitration agreement, the Arbitration Act
allows a piecemeal resolution).
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thought to be incongruous with federal securities laws. As
Professor Loss has noted, all six securities statutes specified
that "any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person
to waive compliance" with any provision of the securities laws
or any rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission was
void. 4 In light of these non-waiver provisions, courts inter-
preted arbitrability of securities disputes as an impermissible
waiver of the legal rights given to investors by the federal
securities statutes.' Such an interpretation led to a "neat
conflict between two socially desirable policies-arbitration
with its advautages of speed and economy and protection of the
rights of investors against persons with superior bargaining
power."26
When the Supreme Court first discussed this conflict in
1953 in Wilko v. Swan, it tilted the balance in favor of judicial
disposition of securities claims.2 Wilko involved fraudulent
misrepresentations a broker made to his customer in violation
of the Securities Act of 1933. The Court considered the selec-
tion of a judicial forum to be crucial in the system of protection
the Securities Act afforded to investors.' In the majority's
view, "the arbitral system.., would not afford the plaintiff the
rights to which he is entitled [under the Securities Act]."2'
In the course of time, however, the Supreme Court gradu-
ally became less suspicious of arbitration's ability to resolve
securities laws claims adequately. Twenty-one years later, in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Supreme Court retreated
from its Wilko position when it considered a Rule 10b-5 claim
emanating out of a sale of a business in which the parties had
agreed to arbitrate disputes under the rules of the Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce in Paris." In Scherk, the Court rea-
soned that, in the context of international contract, the advan-
tages given to plaintiffs by securities laws, which, according to
24 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 4555; see e.g., Exchange Act § 29(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988).
' See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
26 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 4560.
"' Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment in connection with the violation of § 12(2) of the Securities Act), overruled by
Rodriguez DeQuijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 277 (1989).
28 Id. at 435.
2 Id. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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Wilko, may be lost in arbitration, "become chimerical" since the
parties may resort to the foreign courts thus blocking access to
the American courts." Although the international aspect of
the case certainly influenced the justices, the Court appeared
to revise its distrust of securities arbitration. Finally, by the
mid-1980s, in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, where arbi-
trable state claims were joined with then non-arbitrable feder-
al claims arising from the same transaction, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Arbitration Act to require "district courts
to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of
the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result
would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate pro-
ceedings in different forums.'
Next, in 1987, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon' refused to apply Wilko to a 10b-5
claim involving fraudulent conduct by a broker. Although
Wilko was distinguished rather than overruled,' in McMahon
the Court reached a totally different conclusion: "The suitabili-
ty of arbitration as a means of enforcing Exchange Act rights
is evident ... ."' The McMahon Court held that only con-
trary command by Congress could override the Arbitration
Act's mandate to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims.36 A majority of the Court did not find that the Ex-
change Act had issued such a countervailing command; nor
did the court find that arbitration weakened the ability of
investors to recover under section 10(b) of the Act.'
'Ultimately, the Court explicitly overruled Wilko in Rodri-
,Id. at 518.
" Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985). Professor
Bloomenthal considered such an attitude a "strong predilection toward enforcing
predispute agreements to submit disputes to arbitration.' Harold Bloomenthal,
Securities and Federal Corporate Law, in 3A SEC. L. SERIES § 8.30121[a], at 8-
154.1 (1989).
482 U.S. 220 (1987).
"The Court had a perfect reason not to follow the precedent- Wdko was decid-
ed under the Securities Act of 1933, whereas McMahon involved the Securitis
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 234. Other than this formal difference, it is difficult
to explain why arbitration affords investors equivalent protection under the Ex-
change Act and not under the Securities Act.
"McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232 (interpreting Schwrk, 417 U.S. 213).
Id, at 226.
Id. at 227-30.
Id. at 231-34.
1995]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express.39 On facts sub-
stantially similar to those of Wilko, the Court found that the
right to select the adjudicatory forum is not such an essential
feature of the securities laws, nor is it so critical that it cannot
be waived due to the rationale that the securities laws were
intended to place buyers of securities on equal footing with
sellers.4' The Court thus held that the agreements to arbi-
trate securities disputes will be enforced.41
McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas gave the green light to
arbitration. Not long before these Supreme Court decisions, the
SEC similarly had shifted its policies regarding arbitration.
SEC Rule 15c2-2, promulgated prior to McMahon in 1984,42
prohibited brokers' agreements purporting to bind customers to
arbitration and required brokers to disclose the
unenforceability of such agreements. In 1987, the year
McMahon was decided, the SEC found the rule inappropriate
in light of the Supreme Court case law and repealed it.
43
As a result of the Supreme Court decisions and the SEC's
changed policies, arbitration today has become the dominant
method of resolving securities disputes.44 Judicial approval of
securities arbitration has made the definition of arbitration-a
method of alternative dispute resolution-a misnomer. Typical-
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
Id. at 481.
" Id. at 484.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1984) (repealed by SEC Exchange Act Release No.
25,034, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,163 (Oct. 15, 1987)).
" Exchange Act Release No. 25,034, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,163 (Oct. 15, 1987). Not only did the SEC revise its "anti.arbitration
position, but in its amicus brief in McMahon, it supported Shearson's position and
urged the court to enforce an arbitration agreement between the parties. See
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 221 (1987).
" As one commentator noted, "[a]s a consequence of [the Wilko reversal], a
relatively modest arbitration system that had initially been promoted by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission as a consumer protection device for small inves-
tors underwent extraordinary growth in staff, budget, and case load." David A.
Lipton, Generating Precedent in Securities Industry Arbitration, 19 SEC. REG. L.J.
26, 27 (1991). Indeed, the structure of securities arbitration is fairly complex. The
industry has a coordinating body, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion ("SICA"). The plaintiffs' bar also has its own organization, Public Investors
Arbitration Bar Association ("PIABA") created in October 1990. A newsletter called
the Securities Arbitration Commentator regularly reports on significant develop-
ments and cases. See generally Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration 35,
37 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. 882 1994).
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ly, arbitration is the exclusive way of resolving a securities dis-
pute. The exclusivity of arbitration is a byproduct of the very
nature of arbitration-the principle of its finality, which is "a
basic ingredient of the practical-idealistic mix that defines
arbitration and sets it apart from Diogenesic search for truth
to which litigation sometimes aspires." Although due process
guarantees and notions of fairness and impartiality require
that at least some judicial review remain available, the princi-
ple of finality has limited such review substantially, making
arbitration the sole available forum for most claims.
Indeed, unsuccessful arbitrants have very few judicial
options available to change the disposition of their claims. Sub-
stantive law limits the grounds upon which an arbitration
award can be challenged. Four of these grounds-fraud, impar-
tiality, prejudice or overreaching-are enumerated in the sec-
tion 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.46 The other ground for
a vacatur, a "manifest disregard of the law" by arbitrators, is
grounded in common law.47 Finally, the award can be chal-
lenged collaterally, pursuant to the 1988 amendments to the
Arbitration Act.
48
Richard P. Ryder, Arbitration Award Results & Post-Award Proceedings, in 2
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 437, 460 (PLI Course Handbook Series No. 782 1992).
" 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(d) (1988). The award can be vacated: a) where it "was pro-
cured by corruption, fraud, or undue means?; or b) where there was "evident par-
tiality" by arbitrators; or c) one of the parties was prejudiced by the arbitrators'
misbehavior, or d) where "arbitrators exceeded their powers." Id.; cee also Wall
Street Assocs. v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 27 F.3d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1994) (the
grounds listed in the Federal Arbitration Act are the exclusive grounds to vacate
an award, which otherwise should be enforced).
"This doctrine originated with Wilko v. Swan, 346 US. 427, 436-37 (1953),
overruled on different grounds by Rodriguez DeQuijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, 490 U.S. 477 (1989), survived Vdko's overruling, was subsequently elabo-
rated on in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930
(2d Cir. 1986), and has been adopted by the majority of the circuits. See Advest,
Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990); Kanuth v. Prescott Ball & Turben,
Inc. 949 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
' Congress enacted Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16, to limit
interlocutory appeals and to provide for immediate appeals where arbitration is
denied by a court. Unfortunately, this section backfired by offering a means to
vacate an award even if the award is absolutely legitimate. Wiephing v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Securities, 940 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1991), is a good example of how this
occurs. Initially, the arbitration in Wiepking was compelled by the court. Id. at
997. Some claims that were sent to arbitration were non-arbitrable under then-
existing SEC Rule 15c2-2. Id. After the arbitration, the losing party did not chal-
lenge the award per se but rather attacked the initial ruling of the district court
1995]
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In addition to the limits imposed on judicial review by
substantive law, courts have been extremely deferential to
decisions of arbitration panels. Courts that follow a "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" 9 are unlikely
to vacate an award if there is at least some rational explana-
tion of the award.50
This combination of substantive limits and courts' defer-
ence to the arbitration panels' decisions has created a situation
that increases the importance of arbitration time-bars. Most
courts have held that a claim is not eligible for judicial disposi-
tion if its arbitration is time-barred.5 Courts have reasoned
that arbitration is a matter of contract. If the parties have
agreed to submit all claims to arbitration and their agreement
has incorporated the SROs' provisions requiring an aggrieved
party to submit the controversy within six years, the time-
barred party cannot litigate the claim.52 Although the validity
of such an approach is debatable considering the mandatory,
5 3
that had compelled the arbitration. Id. at 999. As a result, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that the district court had improperly compelled the arbitration, and the
otherwise valid award was vacated, despite the fact that the SEC already had
rescinded Rule 15c2-2. Id.
" Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
' Very often, arbitrators do not write opinions and, where there are multiple
causes of action, it is not clear which particular legal theory supports the award.
In such situations, courts most likely would hold that, as long as a winning party
could have reasonably prevailed on the basis of any theory, the award will stand.
See Wall Street Assocs., 27 F.3d at 849 (although the defendants showed that
arbitrators accepted evidence that arguably related to impermissible theory, other
proper theories submitted to arbitrators could have supported the award).
61 See Calabria v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F. Supp
172 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (customer who signed an agreement that contained a manda-
tory arbitration provision was precluded from litigating her claims once she be-
came ineligible to arbitrate her claims by virtue of NASD Section 15); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (investors waived
their rights to pursue remedies in court when they signed arbitration agreements
with a broker); Picollo v. Faragali, Civ. A. No. 93-2958 1993 WL 331933 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 24, 1993) (ineligibility to arbitrate by operation of NASD Section 15 preclud-
ed customer from seeking relief in court); Castellano v. Prudential-Bache See., Inc.,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) l 95,321 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (investor
lost his right to seek alternative forum after the arbitration forum he had selected
dismissed his breach of contract claim as time-barred).
62 Calabria, 855 F. Supp. at 176.
Even though arbitration is a matter of contract, the parties to an agreement
have little or no choice but to accept arbitration. Broker-customer agreements
contain a standard arbitration clause and investors sign on to these clauses when
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rather than voluntarily contractual, nature of arbitration
clauses, the vast majority of courts follow this rule. The de-
termination of a claim's arbitrability therefore is crucial for the
parties.
B. Statutes of Limitations in Securities Industry Disputes
Six-year time-bars on whole operate like statutes of limita-
tions. Unlike most statutes of limitations, however, which are
predicated on a particular legal theory, the arbitration time-
bars apply to all arbitration claims regardless of the substan-
tive law involved.
In addition to this blanket coverage, the process of creat-
ing six-year time-bars also is distinct. As the Supreme Court
stated, it is "axiom[atic] ... that arbitrators derive their au-
thority to resolve disputes only because the parties have
agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration.'
Time-bars to arbitration claims are created by contract rather
than through statute. A typical customer-broker agreement
incorporates an arbitration clause that requires parties to
submit all disputes to arbitration and identifies one or more
arbitration forums where a dispute may be resolved.' Em-
ployment agreements between registered representatives and
SROs' member firms also contain arbitration clauses.' The
they sign the investment contract. As to the employer-employee agreements, all
Self-regulatory organizations ("SRO") require registered representatives to sign a
U-4 form, which contains an arbitration clause. Although the Federal Arbitration
Act excludes employment contracts from its coverage, see 9 U.S.C. § 1, the arbi-
tration clause in the U-4 form was upheld in Gilmer v. InterstateJfohnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991), as a contract with the SRO rather than with an
employer. Finally, even broker-dealers do not have freedom of choice; the SROs'
rules require them to arbitrate all disputes.
' Only one court has suggested that claims that are ineligible for arbitration
by virtue of six-year bar can be relitigated. Prudential Sec., Inc. v. LaPlant, 829
F. Supp. 1239, 1244 (D. Kan. 1993).
s AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of Am, 475 U.S. 643,
648-49 (1986) (citing Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374
(1974)).
1 Cane & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 405. For an example of a typical clause,
see infra note 58.
1 These clauses are part of a required U-4 form. See cupra note 53. On the
employer side, all SROs mandate the arbitration of disputes between its members.
See e.g., Art. VILI of AmEx Constitution, American Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) 1
9062; see also the Uniform Code of Arbitration developed by Securities Industry
1995]
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time-bar provisions along with the other provisions of the
SROs' Code of Arbitration, usually are incorporated into the
agreement by reference." As such, the parties are deemed to
have agreed to exclude from arbitration those claims falling
outside the limitations period.
The theoretical differences between "conventional" statutes
of limitations and time-bar provisions in the SROs' Arbitration
Code has led to differences in the way they are applied. Gener-
ally, courts place time limits on liability in order to make the
law more predictable. As Justice Jackson noted fifty years ago,
time limits "promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared."59 Yet the effectiveness of statutes of limi-
tations may be curtailed when the accrual point is not easily
ascertainable. For example, if a plaintiff was defrauded by a
so-called "Ponzi scheme"" or "pyramid," years may pass be-
fore the fraud is discovered. To avoid injustice, courts have
developed equitable doctrines that toll the applicable limita-
tions period. Equitable tolling postpones a statute of limita-
Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") and adopted by SROs; NASD Code of Arbitra-
tion Procedure, Part HI, § 12, NASD MANUAL (CCH) J 3712. Moreover, failure of
an NASD member to submit a dispute to arbitration is considered by the Board of
Governors to be a violation of Article III, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Fair Practice and
is deemed to be inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. Failure to
Act Under Provisions of Code of Arbitration Procedure: Resolution of the Board of
Governors, NASD MANUAL (CCII) q 3748, at 3731.
' For example, a standard arbitration clause used in employment agreements
in the industry today provides as follows:
Any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or
the interpretation thereof, or your employment or termination of your
employment shall be settled by arbitration under the then prevailing
Constitution and Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. or the
National Association of Securities Dealers, as the initial Complainant
may elect.
Bill T. Singer & Scott I. Noath, Situs Selection in Employment Agreement Arbitra-
tion Clauses, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1992, at 603, 608 (Corporate Law &
Practice Handbook Series No. 781 1992). Broker-customer agreements also incor-
porate the arbitration rules of several SROs.
" Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
'o In a classic Ponzi scheme, named after its inventor, new layers of victims
enable the swindlers to partially repay previously defrauded customers and, thus,
keep the system running for a considerable period of time. For a description of a
Ponzi scheme, see Cunningham v. Brown, 205 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924).
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tions from running until the plaintiff becomes aware or should
have become aware of the wrong.61 The application of equita-
ble tolling may be triggered by either fraudulent concealment
or adverse domination.62 The centerpiece of the equitable toll-
ing doctrine is the discovery rule, which tolls the statute of
limitations until the plaintiff discovers the fraud or should
have discovered it had he exercised due diligence.' Alterna-
tively, the tolling may end when the market itself puts the
plaintiff on constructive or inquiry notice, so that a diligent
person in the plaintiffs position would have discovered the
fraud.?
The doctrine of equitable estoppel, the counterpart of the
equitable tolling doctrine, "acknowledges that the statute [of
limitations] has run, but is invoked to estop the defendant
from asserting this as a defense.' Equitable estoppel has
been applied when "one, by his conduct, lulls another into a
false security, and into a position he would not take only be-
cause of such conduct."
Both equitable tolling and equitable estoppel apply to
statutes of limitations but not to statutes of repose. Unlike a
statute of limitations, a "statute of repose is typically an abso-
lute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is
" Christopher IL Leslie, Den of Inequity; The Caze for Equitable Doctrines in
Rule 10b-5 Cases, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1592 (1993); see also Tregenza v. Great
Am. Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (Equitable tolling just means that with-
out fault by either party the plaintiff does not have enough information to sue
within the period of limitations . . ."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1837 (1994).
' Leslie, supra note 61, at 1592. The doctrine of adverse domination holds
that "where an action is brought on behalf of an entity which has been defrauded
by persons who completely dominated and controlled it, the statute of limitations
is tolled as to controlling wrongdoers during the period of their domination and
control" Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 1983).
For example, section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 bars suit
unless "brought within one year after discovery of the untrue statement or omis-
sion or after such discovery should have been made by exercise of reasonable dili-
gence." 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988) (emphasis added).
See Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350-51 (2d Cir. 1993) (investor
was put on notice that the investments may be unsuitable for him when he re-
ceived prospectuses disclosing the riskiness and illiquidity of the investments);
Tregenza, 12 F.3d at 721-22 (in lob-5 actions, one-year statute of limitations be-
gins to run when investor receives "inquiry notice," at which point the investor
has learned facts that would lead a reasonable person to investigate).
cs Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims: A
Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235, 292 (1989).
Bomba v. W!,. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1071 (7th Cir. 1978).
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not tolled for any reason because to do so would upset the
economic balance struck by the legislative body." Thus, in
most cases, a statute of repose will take a claim out of courts'
subject-matter jurisdiction making it impossible for courts to
apply equitable doctrines. 8
Statutes of repose, statutes of limitations and judge-made
equitable rules create a complex structure that governs time
limits imposed on securities claims. Most commonly, securities-
related disputes encompass claims based on express or implied
rights of action under federal securities laws, civil enforcement
provisions of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act ("RICO"),6" and common law causes of action for
fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of con-
tract.7" In addition, securities arbitration is used in a variety
of employment disputes between the SROs' member firms and
their employees.7 Even this incomplete list of claims72 re-
I First United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862,
866 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
' he existence of equitable doctrines is equally important for arbitration time-
bars. But for the presence of these equitable rules, the six-year limitation on the
submission of a claim to arbitration would have been longer than almost all other
statutes of limitations that control securities-related disputes. Without equitable
extensions of time-limits, the joint application of the six-year time-bar and other
statutes of limitations to a claim would have necessitated a purely mechanical
task best handled by computers.
618 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1988).
70 Professor Grant, who serves as an arbitrator on the NYSE, NASD and AAA
arbitration panels, suggested that the following be a non-exclusive list of claims
that can exist in the broker-customer relationship and may be subject to arbitra-
tion: 1) 10(b) and 10b-5 fraud, 2) RICO; 3) blue sky laws; 4) common law fraud
for misrepresentation; 5) breach of contract; 6) unsuitability; 7) churning; 8) unau-
thorized trading; 9) omissions; 10) margin account liquidation and margin calls; 11)
order failure or mistaken order, 12) forgery; 13) broker ignorance in areas too
dangerous or too complicated; 14) breach of fiduciary duty; 15) failure to supervise;
and 16) insider trading. J. Kirkland Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required
Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 389, 488 (1989).
"' According to a 1991 survey conducted by the Securities Arbitration Commen-
tator, the most frequently asserted claims are: breach of contract, compensation,
defamation, discrimination, and wrongful termination. Ryder, supra note 45, at
457. Employment disputes are governed by different statutes and common law
rules and have their own statutes of limitations. The discussion of time limitations
for these types of claims is outside the scope of this Note. It is worth noting,
however, that the limitations periods and policies underlying them do not neces-
sarily coincide with the six-year time-bar provisions. Thus, it is possible that the
six-year cutoff generally applicable to all arbitrable claims may well conflict with
the policy against, for example, employment discrimination.
r' See e.g., McMahan Sec. Co., v. Forum Capital Markets, [1994-1995 Transfer
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veals a conflict between six-year time-bars and statutes of
limitations. Although existing statutes of limitations in securi-
ties-related disputes rarely exceed six years, judicially created
equitable rules often extend the time limits within which to
bring suit.
The vast majority of claims allege violations of various
provisions of the securities statutes, in particular, their
antifraud provisions. Before 1991, courts applied different
statutes of limitations to securities laws. Express rights of
action were limited by a one-year statute of limitations and a
three-year statute of repose.73 In contrast, the most important
and frequently litigated implied 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions
had no specific limitations periods. Instead, courts followed the
usual rule that, absent an express congressional act, they
would apply similar state fraud statutes of limitations to im-
plied actions. 4 The lack of uniformity created a considerable
disparity in the limitations periods for 10(b) and 10b-5 actions
in the circuits courts. 5 Finally, the Supreme Court, in its de-
cision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson,7  looked to the "statute of origin" 7 and adopted a
uniform scheme from the express right of action provisions of
securities laws that allowed a claim one year from the discov-
ery of the cause of action but no longer than three years.!'
The equitable tolling doctrine had no place in the Lampf
scheme: "[t]he 1-year period, by its terms, begins after discov-
ery of the facts constituting violation, making tolling unneces-
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) I 98,402 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1994) (copyright claims
are suitable for arbitration in a conflict between two broker-dealers).
' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(c), 78m (1988). The exceptions are 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b), which provides for a two-year statute of repose and the insider trading
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (Supp. II, 1990) which contains a five-year time limit.
Although the insider trading limitations period looks long enough to go beyond the
six-year period if tolled, this is not the case because the five.year term starts from
the date of the last transaction in dispute and operates as statute of repose.
"' Lampt Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrov v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355
(1991) ("It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to provide for a federal
cause of action, a court 'borrows' or 'absorbs' the local time limitation most anal-
ogous to the case at hand.).
I Richard L. Jacobson, Shining a Lampf on Section 10(b) Limitations Periods,
6 INSIGHTS 12 (1992).
71 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
71 Id. at 359
"' Id. at 359-60.
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sary. . . . Because "the purpose of the 3-year limitation is
clearly to serve as a cutoff, ... tolling principles do not apply
to that period.' 9
In contrast to the equitable tolling doctrine, the Court has
yet to resolve the application of equitable estoppel to these
claims. In Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co.,80
the Seventh Circuit suggested that equitable estoppel applies
to at least the one-year limitations period." As to the three-
year period, Professor Bloomenthal has argued that, in the
most egregious situations, equitable estoppel may apply to
both parts of the time-limitation scheme.82 He noted:
Equitable estoppel, properly understood, is not inconsistent
with the fact that Congress intended the periods of limitation to be
absolute. The Congress was attempting to assure directors and oth-
ers that, after a period of time, no action would be brought against
them for allegedly false statements made in a registration statement
or otherwise in connection with the sale or purchase of a security.
Congress was not saying that by their own subsequent conduct they
could not, in effect, extend the period of limitation.'
For equitable estoppel to apply, the conduct must go be-
yond the fraud itself and involve an affirmative action by the
defendant that justifiably causes the plaintiff to forbear from
bringing his claim.84 At least one court85 has applied equita-
ble estoppel to the three-year period in an action brought un-
der section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.86 The U.S. Dis-
' Id. at 363.
12 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1993).8 Id. at 721 ("there may still be a room in such a case for equitable estoppel")
(citing Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1055 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly,
J.), and Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990)).
Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 293. Bloomenthal's view appears to be signif-
icant in light of the fact that in its Lampf decision, the Supreme Court bolstered
its discussion of the applicability of equitable tolling to the new time frame for a
lOb-5 action by quoting Bloomenthal. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 292.
Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 297.
In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Secs. Litig., 76 FR.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975),
rev'd, Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 1991). The dis-
trict court decision was finally reversed sixteen years later in Anixter v. Home-
Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420 (10 Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated
on other grounds, Dennler v. Trippet, 503 U.S. 978 (1992). Although Anixter re-
fused to apply equitable estoppel to Section 13 statutes of repose, id. at 1436, it
admitted that "there may be circumscribed settings in which the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel might apply to claims governed by Section 13 .... Id.
Although Home-Stake talked about the application of equitable tolling to the
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trict Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma applied the
doctrine in In re Home-Stake Production Co. Securities Litiga-
tion, where the fraud was extensive, continued for a decade,
and constituted a fraud on the SEC, courts and investors. An-
other case, Zola v. Gordon, also recognized the applicability of
equitable estoppel under appropriate circumstances, to the
three-year statute of repose of section 13 of the 1933 Act.'
The Zola court, however, refused to apply the estoppel because
it did not find affirmative acts by the defendant that would
have forbade the plaintiff from bringing a suit.'
Thus, in the appropriate situation, courts may apply the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to extend the three-year statute
of repose.89 Clearly, whether or not courts apply the doctrine,
a claim under either express or implied provisions of securities
laws has a different time frame than arbitration time-bars.
Civil RICO is another frequently asserted claim in securi-
ties disputes." Since RICO does not provide an express stat-
three-year period, the Southern District of New York explained that in reality the
Home-Stake court "used equitable estoppel against the defendants." Zola v. Gordon,
685 F. Supp. 354, 361 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
"7 Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362.
Professor Bloomenthal suggested that the following facts may require an
application of equitable estoppel: The proceeds of the sale of unregistered, fraction-
al, undivided oil and gas interests are used to drill a dry hole. Investors threaten
to sue under section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, but the defendant-promot-
er assures the investors that the property is still a good prospect, and if they
don't bring a suit, another hole will be drilled on the property at no extra cost.
The statute of limitations then runs and the well has never been drilled.
Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 292. Although the example relates to the one-year
period, it may well apply to the three-year repose.
9 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1988). RICO's civil enforcement provision spe-
cifically provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of Section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate Unit-
ed States district court." Id. § 1964(c).
The RICO limitations period may be longer than the six-year arbitration limi-
tation. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. This inconsistency has al-
lowed defendants to fight their opponents by involing the arbitration time-bars
rather than by attacking the merits of the claim. For an example of a dispute
over the application of six-year time-bars in the context of RICO claims, sea e.g,
Roney & Co. v. Kassab, 981 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992) (it is for the court, not arbi-
trators, to decide whether an investor's RICO claim was barred by the NASD six-
year rule); Edward Jones & Co. v. Sorrels, 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992) (six-year
period of NASD section 15 cannot be tolled by allegations of fraudulent conceal-
ment which were part of investors' RICO claim because section 15 is an eligibility
provision and not a statute of limitations); Smith Barney Shearcon v. Boone, 838
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ute of limitations for actions brought under its civil enforce-
ment provision, the courts simply borrowed limitation periods
from different state laws. In 1987, the Supreme Court ended
this practice in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associ-
ates, Inc.9" The Court applied the four-year statute of limi-
tations from Clayton Act civil enforcement actions92 to civil
RICO actions.93
The Agency Holding Court did not address the application
of equitable doctrines. Nevertheless, case law under the Clay-
ton Act, which lent its statute of limitations to civil RICO,
indicates that fraudulent concealment would toll the limita-
tions period.94 As to the discovery rule, cases subsequent to
Agency Holding have held that the four-year statute of limita-
tions in civil RICO claims brought by defrauded investors ac-
crues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered an
injury, even if he has not yet discovered the pattern of racke-
teering.95 In addition, the majority of circuits apply a so-called
F. Supp. 1156 (NJ). Tex. 1993) (the timeliness of arbitration under the AmEx
time bar provision is decided by arbitrators, not courts); Piccolo v. Faragalli, 1993
WL 331933 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1993) (RICO claim was dismissed since the plaintiff
failed to file for arbitration within six years from the time of events giving rise to
his claims).
483 U.S. 143 (1987).
15 U.S.C. § 15b (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The Court reasoned that the close resemblance between RICO and Clayton
Act civil enforcement provisions was not accidental. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at
151. Examining the legislative history of both statutes, the Court concluded that
"[t]he use of an antitrust model for the development of remedies against organized
crime was unquestionably at work when Congress later considered the bill that
eventually became RICO." Id. at 151-52.
" For cases involving the tolling of statutes of limitations in antitrust actions,
see New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.) (as part of their
scheme, contractors fraudulently concealed their conspiracy to rig the bids on high-
way construction), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988); King & King Enter. v.
Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs' claims were not
barred by statute of limitations, even though they occurred four years before law-
suit instituted, because the evidence showed that defendant fraudulently concealed
its price-fixing activities), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); In re Coordinated
Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 782 F. Supp. 487 (CD.
Cal. 1991) (in horizontal price-fixing schemes, the statute of limitations would be
tolled if plaintiffs showed that defendants fraudulently concealed price-fixing
conspiracy that could not have been discovered had the plaintiffs exercised due
diligence).
"s McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452, 1464-65 (7th Cir. 1992); Granite
Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1991) (a civil RICO cause of
action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should
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"separate accrual" rule to civil RICO claims, where a new
cause of action arises for each separate injury.96
If a civil RICO's limitations period is subject to the discov-
ery rule and arguably to a fraudulent concealment claim, a
RICO claim would not be time-barred beyond six years. For
example, victims of a 'Ponzi scheme" may not have discovered
the fraud for years, even while exercising the utmost diligence.
In such a case, the four-year RICO statute of limitations would
not have accrued until actual or constructive discovery of the
fraud, and the plaintiffs normally would be allowed to proceed
with the claim in court. The situation may differ, however, if
such a claim is asserted in an arbitration forum. The six-year
arbitration time-bars may preclude a claimant from asserting
an otherwise timely claim.
Another conflicting situation occurs when an arbitration
claim is predicated either on state blue sky laws or on a com-
mon law cause of action.97 These causes of action encompass
hundreds of different claims limited by time periods ranging
from one to six years, and in some cases the substantive law
will allow claimants to bring their grievances in a time period
greater than six years. For example, under the common law of
New York, the statute of limitations for an action for actual
fraud is six years from the commission of the wrong or two
have discovered, "both the existence and source of his injury and that the iWjury
is part of a pattern").
Is McCool, 972 F.2d at 1465; see also Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d
1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988) (under the 'separate accrual" rule, the new cause of
action arises when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered injury causd by
each RICO violation), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989); cf. Bath v. Bushlin,
Gaims, Gaines & Jones, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir. 1990) (accrual occurs when a
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence and source of an injury
and that injury was part of a pattern); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d
1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1988) (accrual occurs when a plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known when the last predicate act occurred).
"For cases predicated on a conflict between statutes of limitations for state
statutory or common law claims and arbitration time-bars, see e.g., Dean Witter
Reynolds v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993) (breach of fiduciary duty);
Calabria v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 172 (ND.
Tex. 1994) (common law claims and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. 1023 (EfD. Tenn. 1994) (breach of
fiduciary duty); Soares Fin. Group, Inc. v. Hansten, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 98,316 (Ni). Cal. 1994) (breach of fiduciary duty); Pruden-
tial-Bache v. LaPlant, 829 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Kan. 1993) (fraud, misrepresentation,
negligence and breach of contract); Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ohnuma, 161 Misc. 2d 923, 613 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994).
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years from the discovery of the wrong, whichever is later." In
IT v. Cornfeld, the Second Circuit, applying a New York
statute of limitations, extended the time-limit up to seven
years from the date of an occurrence.9 In IT, the alleged
fraud on investors had been perpetrated well beyond six years
but the court held that the plaintiffs could have discovered the
fraud only after a considerable time, and thus "the action was
brought within two years from the time in which they them-
selves discovered or should have discovered the fraud."0 °
Thus, in New York, an action for actual fraud may be brought
more than six years after the event.10 1
This brief overview of the limitations periods for different
securities-related claims indicates that statutes of limitations
applicable to substantive law underlying an arbitration dispute
may conflict with the six-year time-bar. Further, regardless of
the substantive law, a conflict may occur between six-year bars
and statutes of limitations if they are extended by equitable
doctrines. Shortening the time in which a claim may be
brought by "contract" undermines both the legislative intent
underlying the original time limitations and the judicial policy
18 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 213(8) commentary (McKinney 1990). This interpre.
tation stems from a joint reading of §§ 203(f) and 213(8). Section 203(f) provides
for a two year limitations period "where the time within which an action must be
commenced is computed from the time when facts were discovered or from the
time when the facts could with reasonable diligence have been discovered." Section
213(8) provides for a six-year limitations period for actions for fraud. See also IIT
v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 928-29 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mhe combined effect of CPLR
213(8) and 203(f) thus is 'two separately-timed and alternative limitations periods
in the case of a delayed discovery: six years from accrual or two years from dis-
covery whichever is longer.'").
9 619 F.2d at 929-30. Although Cornfeld was implicitly overruled by the Su-
preme Court's Lampf decision insofar as it applied the state statute to the 10b-5
action, its interpretation of CPLR sections 203 and 213 is in accord with the state
courts' position.
100 Id. at 929. Note, however, that this rule applies only to actual fraud, i.e.,
where a defendant knowingly and intentionally deceived a plaintiff. N.Y. CIV.
PRAC. L. & R. 213(8) commentary. In a case of constructive fraud, the discovery
rule does not apply and the limitations period would be six years from the date of
the commission of the wrong. See McCabe v. Gelfand, 58 Misc. 2d 497, 295
N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968). Yet, many securities claims alleging
common law fraud would involve material misrepresentations made with the intent
to deceive-a cause of action that constitutes actual rather than constructive fraud.
101 In this particular instance, the likelihood of mistaken use of the statute of
limitations and arbitration time-bars is very high as both provide for the same
time period-six years-but operate in an entirely different manner.
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of equitably extending those time limitations.
Even if the substantive statute of limitations is shorter
than the six-year bar, the conflict may still exist. For example,
imagine an investor who has lost all of his savings because of a
broker's fraud but the Lampf time frame bars the claim." A
sympathetic arbitration panel may misinterpret the six-year
time bar as a special "arbitration-related" extension of the ap-
plicable statute of limitations." Furthermore, if a dispute
brought before an arbitration panel contains only one cause of
action-for example, a Rule 10b-5 claim with the three-year
statute of repose-it is likely that such a misinterpretation
would be detected and vacated by a court on the ground of
manifest disregard of the law." Unfortunately, most claims
encompass more than one cause of action, and arbitrators often
do not state the reasons for their awards." In such a case, a
reviewing court would not second-guess the arbitrators' find-
ings and most likely would uphold the award on the ground
that there might be a reasonable basis for an arbitration
award.
06
The Fourth Circuit faced this type of scenario in Miller v.
Prudential-Bache Securities."7 In Miller, after the NASD
panel dismissed the plaintiffs securities claim as untimely, the
plaintiff argued that the arbitrators had misapplied New
York's borrowing statute of limitations.' Moreover, Miller
1"2 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
103 Although the time.bar rules provide that they "shall not extend applicable
statutes of limitations," see, e.g., NASD CA. § 15, N.A.SJD. MANUAL (CCH) I
3715, it nonetheless is possible that arbitrators disregard this unequivocal mes-
sage. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
10, See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
Iss See Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 699 F.2d 410 (6th Cir. 1990)
(Securities Arbitration Rule 42, requiring an award to include a "statement" re-
garding disposition of statutory claims, does not require an arbitration panel to
provide a statement of reasons underlying the award); see also David A. Lipton,
Generating Precedent in Securities Industry Arbitration, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 26, 28
n.7 (1991) ("Some of the concerns that exist relating to the nature of arbitration
include ...the absence of vitten reasoned arbitrator opinions and the impact of
such limitation upon the ability of the parties to bring an appeal....").
' Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1991)
("courts generally 'will not look beyond the lump sum award in an attempt to
analyze the reasoning processes of arbitrators'); see also supra note 50 and ac-
companying text.
D7 884 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990).
118 Id. at 129-30.
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argued that the six-year time-bar from section 15 of the NASD
Code of Arbitration Procedures should be the only limitations
period governing arbitration procedures." 9 Instead of discuss-
ing the nature of statutes of limitations and arbitration time-
bars, the court affirmed the award by simply stating:
Even if Miller's argument is that the panel either misinter-
preted or misapplied the applicable law-in this case either the bor-
rowing statute or Rule 15-there still exists no basis for overturning
the panel's decision. Once again, federal courts have consistently
held that they will not "set aside an arbitrator's award for mere
errors of law.""0
In Miller, the arbitration panel did not accept the plaintiffs
argument that the six-year time-bar is the only limitations
period for the arbitration proceedings. There is no guarantee,
however, that another arbitration panel would reject a similar
argument made by another plaintiff under similar circumstanc-
es. And, if the subsequent panel were to accept such an argu-
ment, a court that follows Miller's approach would uphold that
panel's finding despite its reaching a diametric result.
Thus, the Code of Arbitration Procedures of various SROs
have, in effect, created a separate limitation provision that
merely by virtue of submission applies to all claims submitted
to arbitration. By adopting these provisions, the SROs have
attempted to limit access to their arbitration forums.' Al-
though the arbitration forums are secure in their rights to
create such limitations,"' the conflict between statutes of
limitations and arbitration's six-year time-bars poses a serious
question that may be resolved only by compromise that main-
tains the conflicting policies behind both time limitations.
I Id. at 130.
I10 Id.
... Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39377.
" Even though the practice of limiting access to an arbitration forum may be
reasonable, it is not vital for the forum. For example, the AAA, an alternative
arena for securities-related battles does not have any time limits on the submis-
sion of a claim to arbitration. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 1, at 407 (The 'Secu.
rities Arbitration Rules promulgated by the AAA do not set forth a time limitation
which would bring into question the subject matter jurisdiction of an AAA arbitra-
tion panel to hear an arbitration case properly before it.").
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II. INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF THE TIME-BAR PROVISIONS
Courts interpreting time-bar provisions are split on two
issues."' First, whether the timeliness of a claim should be
determined by courts or by arbitrators. Second, courts disagree
about whether the time-bars are statutes of limitations, subject
to all equitable doctrines, or statutes of repose, intended to cut
off liability regardless of equity.
A. Quod Licet Ioui . .114
The majority of circuits-the Second, Fourth, Eighth,
Ninth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits-have con-
cluded that under the Federal Arbitration Act arbitrators,
rather than courts, should decide statute of limitations is-
sues.11 Most of these circuits simply base their reasoning on
I The split among circuits has allowed litigants to shop for the most favorable
forum. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323 (7th
Cir. 1995), Mferrill Lynch attempted to compel arbitration in the US. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, although the investors had requested,
and the NASD had selected, a Florida arbitration site. Id. at 325. The court noted
with respect to Merrill Lynch's "unreasonable" choice of district court- "The 'whys'
of al this forum shopping are self-evident: If the Northern District of Illinois do-
cides arbitrability, the [mvestors] lose a chunk of their claims; if the decision rests
with the Northern District of Florida, ... potentially stale claims may go to the
arbitrator for resolution." Id. at 326. The Lauer court refused to compel arbitration
in Illinois because Illinois lacked a "geographical link" with the site of the arbitra-
tion. Id. at 327. It seems that Lauer provided a good lesson for brokers who now
will be more careful in selecting "appropriate" arbitration sites in their arbitration
agreements with customers.
"' Quod licet Ioui non licet Bovi ("What is permitted to Jupiter is not permit-
ted to an ox."). This Latin proverb is commonly used to emphasize the limits of
one's powers; in this case, the power of the arbitrators in comparison with the
power of courts.
u' Wylie v. Investment Research & Algmt., Inc., 629 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993). See Afller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128 (4th Cir.
1989) cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990); Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Indus.
Employees Union, Local No. 618 v. Town & Country Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d 509 (8th
Cir. 1983) (arbitrator, not district court, had to decide whether union's alleged
failure to -submit complaint to employer within five working days from notice of
discharge, as required by agreement, barred arbitration); Belke v. Morrinl Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1932) (defendant had not
waived its right to compel arbitration where it brought the motion after the dis-
trict court had determined that the federal securities claims were time barred),
partially abrogated on the other grounds, sub. nor., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
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a Second Circuit case, Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. Philipp
& Lion.116 In Conticommodity, a domestic commodities broker
applied in state court for an order to stay arbitration of a dis-
pute arising out of customer's account. The customer, Philipp
& Lion, a British company, removed the action to federal court
and cross-moved for an order compelling arbitration. At the
center of the controversy was the arbitration clause contained
in the customer agreement between the parties. The clause
provided that any controversy between the parties should be
settled by arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association or one of the Exchanges where
Conticommodity was a member."' Most importantly, the ar-
bitration clause provided that "[a]rbitration must be com-
menced within one year after the cause of action has accrued
",118
The transactions that gave rise to the dispute between
Conticommodity and Philipp & Lion occurred in 1974, but the
claim for arbitration was not filed until 1978.1" The district
court granted a motion to stay but the Second Circuit re-
versed.20 The Circuit court admonished the trial court to not
usurp "procedural" questions from arbitrators.'' According to
the Second Circuit, "judicial hostility," which conflicts with the
"policy considerations embodied in the Federal Arbitration
Act,"22 often compels courts to overreach in deciding proce-
dural issues. Although the court correctly described the federal
policy favoring arbitration, the statement itself was predicated
on the view that timeliness was a procedural question."
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213; see also O'Neel v. NASD, 667 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1982);
Conticommodity Servs. Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir. 1980); Hanes
Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (where the parties agreed to re-
solve all contractual disputes by arbitration, trial judge did not have jurisdiction to
render declaratory judgment that any claim arising from the assignment contract
was barred by statute of limitations). It is significant that most of the precedents
cited by the Wylie court had nothing to do with the issue of arbitration time-bars.
Wylie, however, is not the only case decided by following inapplicable authorities.
See infra notes 127 & 146-47 and accompanying text.
118 613 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Id. at 1223 n.1.
118 Id.
.. Id. at 1224.
,2' Id. at 1223.
1 Contieommodity, 613 F.2d at 1224.
122 Id.
' Unfortunately, Conticommodity blurred the distinction between the procedural
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To support its finding that arbitration time-bars are proce-
dural defenses, the Conticommodity court reviewed section 4 of
the Arbitration Act. This section directs judges, "upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,... [to] make
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration."'
The Conticommodity court properly concluded that "unless the
'making' of the agreement to arbitrate ... is in dispute, the
court must compel arbitration."' The court's next statement,
however, conflicts with the preceding conclusion. Strangely, the
court found that "[in the present case, the existence of an
arbitration agreement . . . [was] undisputed."" Contrary to
the court's assertion that the agreement to arbitrate was un-
disputed, however, the parties had agreed to not arbitrate
disputes older than one year. The Conticommodity court over-
looked the fact that the one-year provision was a part of the
arbitration agreement and thus was related to the "making of
the agreement." Therefore, that issue should have been decided
by the court according to section 4 of the Arbitration Act."
The validity of Conticommodity appears doubtful in light
of subsequent Supreme Court cases, and particularly, AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America,'
and substantive aspects of time-bars. For a discussion of the distinction between
procedural and substantive aspects of time-bars, see infra notes 166-86 and accom-
panying text.
"' Conticommodity, 613 F.2d at 1225 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
225 Id.
12 Id.
To draw additional support for its holding, the Conticommodity court mistak-
enly relied upon a district court case, In re Reconstruction Finance Application,
106 F. Supp. 358, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), that had addressed the statute of limi-
tations defense in arbitration proceedings. Conticommodity, 613 F.2d at 1225. Re-
construction Finance is distinguishable, however, because the regular statutes of
limitations are, by definition, affirmative defenses, whereas the arbitration time-bar
is more like a jurisdictional statement that goes to the heart of the question of
whether or not parties have agreed to arbitrate stale claims. Indeed, the time-bar
provisions of various SROs contain the word "eligibility" and are viewed by the
SROs themselves as jurisdictional limitations. See infra note 254 and accompany-
ing text. Although the one-year time limit at issue in Conticommadity did not con-
tain the word "eligibility" or any other words of a like import, it was, neverthe-
less, part of an agreement to arbitrate. Since an arbitration agreement is the
source of arbitrators' jurisdiction over a claim, every part of this agreement is part
of a jurisdictional statement.
2 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (courts, not arbitrators, decide, as a preliminary matter,
whether the parties to collective bargaining agreement intended to arbitrate claims
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where AT&T and its worker's union entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement covering telephone equipment installa-
tion workers." Article 8 of the agreement provided for arbi-
tration of differences arising over interpretation of the agree-
ment, but Article 9 clarified that AT&T's decisions regarding
the hiring, placement and termination of employees were not
subject to the arbitration clause.13 After AT&T laid off sev-
enty-nine installers from its Chicago location, the union filed a
grievance and sought to compel arbitration by filing suit in
federal district court. The district court held that it was for the
arbitrator, not the court, to decide whether the claim had mer-
it, and ordered AT&T to arbitrate.' On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. 3
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions
and stated that "the question of arbitrablity... is undeniably
an issue for judicial determination."133 In light of the AT&T
holding, a court that follows Conticommodity in finding arbi-
tration time-bars to be procedural defenses must first decide
whether the time-bars affect the arbitrability of a claim. In
other words, the threshold question is whether the parties to
the arbitration agreement intended for claims older than six
years to be resolved by arbitration.
Unfortunately, many courts neglect this part of analysis,
and simply follow the Conticommodity reasoning. For example,
in Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner," the Second
Circuit held that "any limitations defense-whether stemming
from the arbitration agreement, arbitration association rule, or
state statute-is an issue to be addressed by the arbitra-
tors."" A district court in New York followed this approach
in Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Noonan,
136
arising out of layoffs by the employer).
'2 Id. at 644.
130 Id. at 645.
,3 Id. at 645-47.
12 Id. at 647; see Communications Workers of Am. v. Western Bloc. Co., 751
F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1984), judgment vacated by AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Commu-
nications Worders of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
" AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649.
-4 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991).
is Id. at 121 (citing Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d
1222, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1980)).
" [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 96,973, at 94,174
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reasoning that:
Since the NASD Code reserves the right to interpret all provisions
under its Code [referring to section 351, including Section 15, and
since the Second Circuit has mandated that any limitations defense
is in the province of the arbitrators, this Court compels arbitration
before the NASD in New York City and defers to the arbitrators
judgment on the issue of timeliness of respondents' claims."1
The Noonan court did not attempt to explore the peculiar na-
ture of the arbitration time-bars, instead preferring to rely on
the Second Circuit's "mandate."
The Ninth Circuit in O'Neel v. NASD,'" analyzed the
timeliness of an arbitration claim under the NASD CAP sec-
tion 15 in a similar fashion. Relying on Conticommodity, the
court wrote:
We adopt the rule enunciated in [Conticommodity], which holds, in
effect, that the validity of time-barred defenses to enforcement of
arbitration agreements should generally be determined by the arbi-
trator rather than by the court. We specifically renounce the conten-
tion that the defense of the statute of limitations goes to jurisdiction
of the tribunal, whether it be judicial or arbitration."
OWeel failed to recognize the difference between a statute of
limitations defense and the time-bar of an arbitration agree-
ment, which provides the sole source of subject matter jurisdic-
tion for arbitration panels. Although O'Neel, like
Conticommodity, had been decided before AT&T, lower courts
in the Ninth Circuit nevertheless adopted ONeel's reasoning
without questioning it in light of the AT&T decision.
In contrast, the Northern District of California in Soares
Financial Group, Inc. v. Hansten," at least recognized the
relevance of AT&T, although it too failed to analyze the time-
bar as an eligibility requirement. Soares held that "[blecause
the interpretation of § 15 lies within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the arbitration panel, this court must defer to the NASD
(SI).N.Y. July 31, 1992).
1 Id. at 94,180 (emphasis added). The validity of the argument that section 35
of the NASD Code mandates referral of the issues of timeliness under the time-
bar rules is discussed, infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
13 667 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 807 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
[ 1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC) 98,316, at 90,208 (ND.
Cal. June 16, 1994) (citing O'Neel v. NASD, 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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arbitration panel's interpretation." To support its deference to
the NASD arbitration panel's determination of the time-bars,
the court reasoned that under AT&T, a court was not to rule
on the potential merits of an underlying claim."' The Soares
court, however, failed to recognize that the arbitration time-
bars related more to the arbitrability of a claim rather than to
its merits.
4 1
Conticommodity had far-reaching effects. Even though
some courts did not follow Conticommodity directly, they rea-
soned in a similar fashion and relied on other precedents that
had considered statute of limitations defenses in the context of
arbitration. The federal district court in Minnesota used such
reasoning in FSC Securities Corp. v. Freel,4 1 where a broker
asserted that section 15 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Pro-
cedures time-barred its clients' claims concerning certain in-
vestments in a limited partnership. The court acknowledged
that a Seventh Circuit case, Edward D. Jones & Co. v.
Sorrells,'4 which held the arbitration time-bars to be a ques-
tion for courts rather than arbitrators, was "directly on point
and, if followed, would require vacation of the arbitration
14 Soares, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,316, at 90,207
(citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,
650 (1986)).
142 Similarly, in Wylie v. Investment Management & Research, Inc., 629 So. 2d
898, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), a Florida state court thoroughly analyzed fed-
eral law to decide whether a court, under the Federal Arbitration Act, can stay
arbitration of a claim that became stale under the NASD CA.P. Section 15. Id.
The Wylie court too failed to distinguish arbitration time-bars from the rest of
statute of limitation defenses applicable to a particular cause of action and con-
cluded that the NASD six-year time-bar was a procedural defense that had to be
heard by an arbitration panel. Id. at 901. To support this conclusion, the court
extensively quoted the language from ContiCommodity, reasoning that a court may
decide only two issues: first, whether there is an agreement to arbitrate, and sec-
ond, whether the party to such an agreement has refused to arbitrate. Id. at 900.
All remaining issues, including limitations, are for arbitrators to decide. Id. Wylie
also relied on Miller v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 884 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1989), which
dealt with the state statute of limitations defense and not with the arbitration
time-bars. Some of the federal courts considering the issue of arbitration time-bars
have also relied on this distinguishable authority. See infra notes 146-147 and ac-
companying text.
1"3 811 F. Supp. 439 (D). Minn. 1993).
1" 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992). This case posits that time-bars are substantive
limitations subject to judicial disposition. For a discussion of Sorrels, see infra
notes 158-65 and the accompanying text.
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award."'45 The court instead chose to follow the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Miller v. Prudential-Bache Securities,'46
where the claim had been timely filed for arbitration but was
dismissed by arbitrators as untimely under the state statute of
limitations applicable to the claim. The Freel court missed this
distinction and stated that it agreed with the Miller court that
"section 15 is a procedural provision to be interpreted by the
arbitrators rather than a substantive limitation on
arbitrability to be interpreted by the court."147
Subsequently, the holding of the district court in Freel was
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, although without reference to
Miller.' The Eighth Circuit instead relied on section 35 of
the NASD Code, which empowers arbitrators to interpret all
provisions of the Code.' According to the Eighth Circuit, the
parties expressly had agreed to have their dispute governed by
the entire NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, including
section 35.150 The court inferred from this section that "the
parties' adoption of this provision is a 'clear and unmistakable'
expression of their intent to leave the question of arbitrability
to the arbitrators." 5' The court, however, failed to recognize
that section 15 precedes section 35, and as such its position in
the Code indicates that a claim initially must be arbitrable.
Arbitrators thus may determine the applicability of the provi-
sions of the Code only for arbitrable claims. 2 If a claim is
ineligible for submission-i.e., the parties to an arbitration
agreement have not agreed to arbitrate this kind of
F" reel, 811 F. Supp. at 442.
884 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990).
147 Freel, 811 F. Supp. at 443. The Miller court never said that section 15 is a
procedural defense. Moreover, the Al a!er court never analyzed saction 15, and
indeed mentioned it in a totally different context. See supra notes 107-09 and the
accompanying text.
FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994).
1 Id. at 1312. Section 35 provides in pertinent part: 'The arbitrators shall be
empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under this
Code ... ." NASD MAUAL (CCH) 9 3735.
11 FSC, 14 F.3d at 1312-13.
Id.
1E2 Even the NASD itself, in proposing amendments to section 15, did not ad-
vance a section 35 argument to support its contention that timeliness under sec-
tion 15 should be decided within the forum. See generally SEC Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 33,108, 1993 WL 441275 (Oct. 26, 1993); SEC Exchange Act Releaze No.
34,442, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,373 (Aug. 2, 1994).
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claim-then there is nothing for arbitrators to interpret.153
Although the majority of the circuits consider time-bars to
be procedural defenses, the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits
have presented decisions that are more persuasive and accord
better with Supreme Court precedent. For example, in
PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnam,'" the Seventh Circuit did not
require the brokerage firm to enter arbitration with customers
whose claims were more than six years old.155 Farnam in-
volved unsuitable investments and material misrepresenta-
tions allegedly made by a PaineWebber employee who had left
its employ more than six years before the claim was filed with
an NASD arbitration panel.156 To support its conclusion that
arbitration was not required, the court cited a NASD letter
indicating that section 15 was an eligibility requirement rather
than a statute of limitations.5 7 Although the NASD position
cannot be regarded as an ultimate authority on the issue, it
helped the Farnam court to distinguish the time-bars from
statutes of limitations.
Another significant Seventh Circuit case, Edward D. Jones
& Co. v. Sorrells,'" followed the reasoning of Farnam. In
Sorrells, investors claimed that their stockbroker had made
material misrepresentations, failed to supervise its employees,
and violated federal securities laws.159 A "Statement of
Claim" was filed with an NASD arbitration panel in 1988,
seven years after the transactions in question had oc-
curred. 60 The Sorrells court stated: "We decline to reconsider
our explicit holding in PaineWebber [v. Farnam] that NASD
Section 15 operates as an eligibility requirement which bars
from arbitration claims submitted more than six years after
the event which gave rise to them."'61 The investors attempt-
15 See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
"' 870 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989).
"6 Id. at 1292.
1 Id. at 1288.
Id. (the letter cited was from John R. Wylie, an NASD Staff Attorney, to
Walter C. Greenough dated Aug. 5, 1988).
Bs 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992).
I" Id. at 510.
"o Id. Since the case had been filed before Lampf was decided, the securities
claim was governed by the state statute of limitations and subject to equitable
tolling.
" Id. at 512.
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ed to distinguish Farnam, pointing out that in 1984 section 15
had been amended to delete the words "[shall not be eligible]
in any instance." '62 They argued the deletion demonstrated
that the 1984 amendments' purpose was to remove the abso-
lute time-bar from the NASD Code."c The court disagreed,
noting that the 1984 Amendments also had added the words
"nor shall [this section] apply to any case which is directed to
arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction."' Examin-
ing the amendments as a whole, the court concluded that "Sec-
tion 15's bar on all claims older than six years is removed only
if a court with jurisdiction over the claim orders the matter be
submitted to arbitration."'" Thus, Sorrells stands for two
very important propositions: first, the arbitration time-bars are
substantive and not procedural limits on a claim; and second,
the court is the only proper forum for the determination of a
claim's timeliness under the time-bar provisions.
Unfortunately, the Farnam and Sorrells courts did not
extend their inquiries beyond the NASD interpretation of the
time-bars. In contrast, the Third Circuit in PaineWebber Inc. v.
Hartmann6" and PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann167 presented
a far broader analysis. In Hartmann, the Third Circuit re-
viewed a district court's interpretation of the NYSE Depart-
ment of Arbitration's, Rule 603, which the parties had incorpo-
rated by reference into their arbitration agreement.s The
case involved PaineWebber's allegedly fraudulent mishandling
of the Hartmanns' account.'69 Although the opinion did not
12 Id. at 513.
16 Id. at 513.
" Sorrells, 957 F.2d at 513.
15 Id.
, 921 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1990) (six-year eligibility requirement under NYSE
C.A.P. § 603).
17 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993) (NASD CA.P. § 15).
16 Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 509. The language of Rule 603 is identical to that of
the NASD CAP. section 15. Both provide:
No dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to arbi-
tration under this Code where six (6) years shall have elapred from the
occurrence or event giving rise to the act or the dispute, claim or contro-
versy. This section shall not extend applicable statutes of limitation, nor
shall it apply to any case which is directed to arbitration by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
NYSE GuIDE (CCHI) 9 2603 (1992).
169 Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 509.
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state legal theories advanced by the plaintiffs, it would be safe
to assume that the Hartmanns alleged a Rule 10b-5 violation.
At the time of this claim, in 1990 (before the Lampf decision),
Rule 10b-5 claims were governed by borrowed statutes of limi-
tations, so the application of a six-year arbitration time-bar
was crucial for the case."' The district court interpreted Rule
603 to be a substantive bar on the arbitrability of claims."'
In upholding the district court's interpretation, the Third Cir-
cuit specifically distinguished the substantive language of Rule
603 from that of rules considered procedural in nature.12 Ac-
cording to the court,
the plain language of Rule 603 states that after six years from the
events giving rise to a dispute have elapsed, the dispute "shall [not]
be eligible for submission to arbitration."... "Eligible" is defined as
"fitted or qualified to be chosen or used" or "worthy to be chosen or
selected."... "Submission" is defined as the act of "commit[ing
something] for consideration, study, or decision.""'
The court then conducted an interesting verbal experiment. It
incorporated the dictionary definitions into the text of the rule
and concluded that "a dispute 'shall [not] be worthy to be cho-
sen or selected for [the] consideration, study, or decision [of]
arbitration.""" This perfect demonstration of the jurisdiction-
al nature of the time-bars was the best argument the
Hartmann court could advance.
Having formulated Rule 603 as a substantive rather than
a procedural provision, the Hartmann court emphasized that
arbitration should be compelled unless it can be said with
"positive assurance" that the agreement to arbitrate does not
cover the dispute."5 To this end, "a compelling case for
nonarbitrability should not be trumped by a flicker of interpre-
tive doubt." If the court determines that the matter at is-
170 Apparently, PaineWebber was afraid that the applicable statute of limitations
could have been tolled and, as it might have been interpreted by arbitrators,
would not bar the Hartmanns' claims. Therefore, it invoked NYSE Rule 603 in a
more predictable judicial forum. Id.
17 Id. at 509-10.
172 Id. at 513-14.
173 Id. at 513 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 736 &
2277 (1966)).
174 Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 513.
17 Id. at 512.
176 Id. at 513.
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sue clearly falls outside of the substantive scope of the agree-
ment, it must enjoin arbitration.'"
PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann" further developed the
Hartmann court's argument. In 1977, Mr. Hofinann opened an
investment account with PaineWebber's Philadelphia brokers,
and invested in municipal bonds and conservative-to-moderate-
risk stocks.179 In 1980, Hofmann's account was assigned a
PaineWebber broker who invested most of Hofmann's assets in
stocks, which subsequently lost almost all of their value in the
October, 1987 stock market crash.' Hofinann filed a claim
with the NASD in October 1991, which alleged that
PaineWebber and its broker had engaged in a fraudulent
scheme to support the price of the stock they sold to Hofmann
for their own benefit, and in furtherance of this scheme, the
broker executed unauthorized trades and made unsuitable
recommendations. 8' Because the majority of purchases had
occurred before October 1985, PaineWebber asserted that sec-
tion 15 of the NASD Code barred Hofnann's claims." Thus,
the Hofmann court was asked to decide whether the court or
arbitrators should determine the timeliness of the submission
of Hofinann's claims to arbitration.
Analyzing the issue, the court noted that fundamentally,
"arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be re-
quired to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed so to submit."s The Hofmann court acknowledged
the Federal Arbitration Act's strong presumption in favor of
coverage by an arbitration agreement.s The court also
agreed that "[lianguage less distinct than 'eligible for submis-
sion to arbitration' might well be insufficient to overcome the
strong jurisprudential pull towards the arbitration."IM This
177 Id. at 511.
178 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993).
1 Id. at 1374.
ISO Id
"I Id. at 1375. Although the court did not say which legal theory Hofmann
asserted, it appears from the description of the facts that he brought claims for
violation of securities laws, civil RICO and for common law fraud.
19 Id.
1I Id. at 1376 (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)).
Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1377 (quoting AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650).
18 Id. at 1379 (quoting Hartmann, 921 F.2d. at 514).
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"pull" notwithstanding, Hofmann held that this presumption
toward arbitration had been overcome since "§ 15 can reason-
ably be read in only one way-as a substantive limit on the
claims that the parties have contracted to submit to arbitra-
tion.;A
8 6
The Hartmann-Hofmann logic was followed by the Sixth
Circuit in Roney & Co. v. Kassab"7 and Dean Witter Reynolds
v. McCoy.' Heavily relying on Hartmann, Roney held that
according to NYSE Rule 603, the court first must examine the
contract provisions concerning arbitration to determine the
particular grievances that the parties intended to subject to
arbitration."9 The following year in McCoy, the court reached
the same conclusion with respect to NASD section 15.9'
In addition to federal courts, the "substantive" position has
been adopted by New York state courts. Though opponents of
this position have asserted the Second Circuit's
Conticommodity ruling, New York courts have rejected this
argument. Instead, New York courts cite to Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Ju-
nior University,9' a Supreme Court case that held that the
Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt a choice of state law
to govern the arbitration. 9 ' Thus, the New York courts pre-
'so Id.
187 981 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992).
1 995 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993).
18 Roney, 981 F.2d at 899.
"o McCoy, 995 F.2d at 651. Although "substantive" courts posit that the court
is the appropriate forum for determining the timeliness of a submission of claims
to arbitration, their reasoning is not uniform. For instance, the district court in
Prudential Securities, Inc. v. LaPlant, 829 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Kan. 1993) following
Hofmann and Roney, took the approach that section 15 of the NASD Code acts as
a substantive bar akin to a statute of repose. Id. at 1243. Yet the court diverged
from other "substantive" circuits and stated that section 15 does not give a court
the right to determine that an issue should go to arbitration when it is more than
six years old. Id. at 1244. Then the court turned back once again and, having
found the eligibility requirement to be a substantive bar to arbitration that thus
cannot be tolled, did not send to arbitration claims that were clearly outside six-
year time limits. Id. This decision supports the inference that the District of Kan-
sas would not compel the arbitration of claims found to be older than six years.
Nevertheless, despite an apparent difference between the LaPlant analysis and the
Hofmann approach, the LaPlant court can be regarded as one that follows other
"substantive" courts because LaPlant, like the other "substantive" courts deems the
issue of the arbitration time-bars to be in the province of the judiciary, not ar-
bitrators.
1 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
" See In re Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193,
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ferred the "substantive" interpretation of the time-bars and felt
that the timeliness of a claimant's demand for arbitration
should be left to the courts' discretion. 93 In fact, New York
courts went even further, considering all statute of limitations
issues to be subject to a preliminary judicial determination."
These decisions, although not made under the Federal
Arbitration Act, are important for three reasons. First, the
Federal Arbitration Act was modeled after the New York Arbi-
tration Act.'95 Second, New York always has held a signifi-
cant place in the securities industry. Finally, New York courts
in these cases interpret the time-bar provisions of the SROs'
arbitration rules, just as their federal colleagues do.
B. To Toll or Not to Toll?
Although the "substantive" circuits may offer a more con-
vincing analysis of the issue than the 'procedural" majori-
ty,' their view falters in the application of equitable
rules.'97 Because "procedural" circuits do not distinguish be-
tween time-bars and statutes of limitations, equitable doctrines
are considered equally applicable to each. The treatment of eq-
uitable doctrines, however, is not so easy for courts that con-
sider time-bars to be a species of statutes of repose. A statute
of repose acts as a cutoff to assure a definite end to liabili-
ty.9' It therefore is difficult to reconcile the flexibility of eq-
623 N.Y.S.2d 800, 647 N..2d 1308 (N.Y. 1995); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. DeChaine, 194 A.D.2d 472, 600 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1st Dep't 1993).
"s DeChaine, 194 A.D.2d at 473, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 460; cee also In re Prudential
Bache Sec. v. Archard, 179 A.D.2d 652, 579 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1st Dep't 1992); Meernill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ohnuma, 161 Esc. 2d 423, 613 N.Y.S.2d
811 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994).
" Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d at 195, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 802, 647 N.E.2d at 1310 (under
New York statutory and case law a court may address, on a motion to compel or
stay arbitration, the threshold question of whether the claim sought to be arbitrat-
ed would be time-barred if it were asserted in state court); see alco N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & I 7502(b) & 7503 (Mcnney 1990).
"' See S. REP. No. 536, supra note 18, at 3 (&The [Federal Arbitration Act]
follows the lines of the New York arbitration law enacted in 1920, amended in
1921, and sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the matter of Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.").
"' See supra notes 154-94 and accompanying text.
117 Since the "procedural" courts deem time-bars to be a province of arbitrators,
they do not have to reach the question of equitable tolling.
31 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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uity with the rigidity of statutes of repose. Once the time pre-
scribed by the statute of repose has expired, equity doctrines
cannot let a claim pass this boundary.
This consequence is the likely explanation for the Seventh
Circuit's view that section 15 of the NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure is not a statute of limitations and may not be tolled
by allegations of fraudulent concealment.'99 Similarly, the
Third Circuit found the tolling doctrine inapplicable in
PaineWebber v. Hofmann, so that the district court would have
to enjoin arbitration if "the claim is clearly no more than a
tolling or discovery argument.""° Alternatively, the court
found, arbitrators should decide what constitutes an "occur-
rence or event." ' '
The district courts in the Sixth Circuit are in disagreement
over the issue of interaction of equitable doctrines and six-year
eligibility rules. According to the district court in Dean Witter
Reynolds v. McCoy, the date of an "occurrence or event" is the
date of investment and does not depend on the date when the
aggrieved investor first discovered the loss.0 2 McCoy, howev-
er, did not settle the issue. Two years before the district court
on remand decided McCoy, the Sixth Circuit in Roney & Co. v.
Kassab.. held that plaintiffs challenging the untimeliness of
their claim under the NYSE eligibility rule had failed to state
a fraudulent concealment claim sufficiently because they had
not shown the required affirmative act.0 4 Based on this hold-
ing, the Sixth Circuit, in remanding McCoy, suggested that an
exception to the six-year eligibility requirement may exist
where the wrongful conduct has been fraudulently con-
cealed.0 5 The district court, on remand, found fraudulent
"' Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1992);
accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jana, 835 F. Supp. 406, 411
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (under Section 15 of the NASD Code, the arbitration panel has no
jurisdiction over any claim not submitted to arbitration within six years of the
"event or occurrence" leading to the dispute; an "event or occurrence" is the date
of investment).
200 984 F.2d 1372, at 1382 (3d Cir. 1993).
201 Id. at 1382-83. The position stated in Hofmann is discussed infra notes 225.
29 and accompanying text.
202 Dean Witter Reynolds v. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. 1023, 1030-31 (E.D. Tenn.
1994).
203 981 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992).
204 Id. at 900.
20 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649, 651 (6th Cir. 1993).
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concealment inapplicable to the six-year rule, because it con-
sidered this rule a statute of repose rather than a statute of
limitations. 6 Yet, another district court in the Sixth Circuit
subsequently held, in Davis v. Keyes, that section 15 of the
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedures operates as a statute of
repose "except in the cases where the claim involves fraudulent
concealment." 7 In the case of fraud, the '"occurrence or
event,' which starts the running of the six-year eligibility peri-
od, is the date of discovery of the fraud." 8
In sum, courts appear to apply traditional reasoning to
compare six-year time-bars either to statutes of repose or to
statutes of limitations when ruling on arbitration time-bars.
First, they decide whether the time-bar rule is a procedural
(like a statute of limitations) or substantive (like a statute of
repose) limitation on the arbitrability of a claim. Next, they
decide which forum-arbitration or courts-should resolve the
issue. This sequence in courts' reasoning may be reversed.
Noietheless, all courts associate the finding that time-bars are
procedural limits with the finding that the timeliness issue
should be determined by arbitrators. By the same token, if
courts find that time-bars operate as statutes of repose, they
find that judges, not arbitrators, determine the arbitrability of
a claim.
Because the time-bar provisions are unique in that they
are created in part by contract and in part by statute, a con-
ventional analysis does not seem to be practical. Following this
approach, if an arbitration time-bar is considered a statute of
limitations subject to all equitable rules, this necessarily leaves
the determination of timeliness of a claim to arbitrators. Con-
versely, if the issue of timeliness is appropriately disposed of
by courts, this implies that the time-bar operates as a statute
of repose inconsistent with equitable tolling. This reasoning
fails to consider the possible conflict with the limitations peri-
ods for the substantive predicate of a claim. To avoid this con-
206 Id,
"' Davis v. Keyes, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (COB) q1 98,387 at
90,637 (El). Mlich. Aug. 1 1994). Interestingly, Judge Feildns in Michigan barad
his decision on Roney and the McCoy circuit case, the same canes that led Judge
Edgar in Tennessee to hold otherwise in McCoy on remand.
s Id. at 90,636.
1995]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
flict, a court should analyze arbitration time-bars from a differ-
ent perspective.
C. Breaking the Circle
As a threshold matter, the arbitrability of claims under
the time-bar rules should be the courts' prerogative. In AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America,"9
the Supreme Court explained that "the question of arbi-
trability... is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.
Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provided other-
wise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is
to be decided by the court not the arbitrator."10 In addition,
the time-bar provisions' plain language that "[n]o dispute,
claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission to arbitra-
tion"21' indicates that the six-year limitation is an eligibility
requirement that strips arbitrators of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over the stale claim. Furthermore, the application of the
arbitration time-bars is a complex matter and courts are un-
doubtedly better able to handle this question than arbitrators.
The next issue is the applicability of equitable rules to the
time-bar provisions. Central to this issue is that arbitration is
a matter of contract and no party should be forced to arbitrate
a claim that it did not agree to submit to arbitration.12
Courts, however, are "not to rule on [the] potential merits of
the underlying claims."21 3 From the first premise it follows
that allowing tolling permits a party to circumvent the contrac-
tual limitation of the six-year time-bar, thereby forcing the
party to arbitrate a claim it never agreed to arbitrate.2 " Also,
if courts cannot rule on the merits of the claim, they cannot
apply equitable tolling or the discovery rule because this would
prevent arbitrators from determining the merits of the
claim.2
15
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that tolling doc-
209 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
210 Id. at 649.
2,, NASD CA.P. § 15, NASD MANUAL (CCH) % 3715 (1994).
212 See AT&T, 475 U.S. at 648.
213 Id. at 649_50.
214 PaineWebber v. Hofimann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993).
216 See AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650.
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trines are inapplicable to six-year time-bars. But such a con-
clusion inevitably conflicts with the statutes of limitations
governing the underlying claims, which may be extended by
equitable rules and thus can allow for a longer period to bring
a claim. As the district court in Prudential Securities, Inc. v.
LaPlant suggested, the conflict may be resolved by allowing a
party precluded by the six-year time bar to relitigate the claim
later in court.
216
A few objections exist to this approach, however. For in-
stance, relitigation of claims ineligible for arbitration may
violate the federal policy favoring arbitration. As the Supreme
Court stated in Southland Corp. v. Keating, "[clontracts to
arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore
the contract and resort to the courts. Such a course could lead
to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by
contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate.' 7 Underly-
ing a federal right to enforcement of arbitration agreement
terms is a party's contractual right to a particular forum and
procedures that are more efficient, expeditious and simple than
litigation.218 Hence, the majority of courts are reluctant to al-
low the relitigation of claims precluded from arbitration by a
six-year time-limit.219 Those courts hold that by entering into
an arbitration agreement a party to the agreement waives her
rights to resort to a judicial forum.'
Although the practice of prohibiting relitigation of non-
arbitrable claims seems accepted universally, it nonetheless
creates an inconsistency in the treatment of time-bars. If, by
implication, the parties to an arbitration agreement have
agreed to not arbitrate claims beyond the six-year time limit, it
"' 829 F. Supp. 1239, 1244 (D. Kan. 1993).
217 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984).
18 Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202, 213 (3d Cir. 1993) (where Fed-
eral Arbitration Act provided basis for federal preemption claim, district court
could not abstain and had to address merits of claim), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 741
(1994).
219 See Calabria v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F. Supp.
172 (ND. Tex 1994); Picollo v. Faragalli, Civ.A.No. 93-2758 1993 WL 331933 (ED.
Pa. Aug. 24, 1993); Castellano v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., [1990 Transfer Bind-
er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCEO q 95,321, at 95,536 (investor vms not entitled to seek
an alternative forum for his untimely claims).
22 See, eg., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. 1023, 1033-34
(E.D. Tenn. 1994); Calabria, 855 F. Supp. at 176-77; Piccolo, Civ. A. No. 93-2758,
1993 WL 331933, at *2.
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follows that claims older than six years are not covered by the
agreement; therefore, there is nothing for the parties to waive.
Although this reasoning appears to be very logical, it may lead
to disastrous consequences. As the court in Piccollo v.
Faragalli warned, "for us to find that plaintiff could assert his
claims in [judicial] forum after having been time-barred from
asserting them in arbitration, would only encourage a plaintiff
seeking to avoid arbitration to wait six years and then assert
his claims in federal district court. ' 1
Given that investors do not trust SROs' arbitration forums
because they are created by the securities industry itself, and
would rather bring their claims before a potentially more sym-
pathetic jury, the outcome described in Piccollo is very plausi-
ble. As a result, courts would be clogged with stale claims "that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared."'
As the conflict between time-bars and statutes of limita-
tions cannot be resolved by allowing plaintiffs to relitigate
stale, non-arbitrable claims, another solution is needed. An
interesting compromise was offered by PaineWebber Inc. v.
Hofmann.' This solution allows a determination of eligibili-
ty to remain with the courts as the Federal Arbitration Act
and Supreme Court cases require, while enabling courts to
minimize consideration of the merits of an underlying claim.
Furthermore, it helps avoid a direct conflict with the statute of
limitations that controls an underlying claim.
Although most of the transactions in dispute in Hofmann
had occurred outside the six-year period, the plaintiff alleged
that some events fell within the six-year period: (1) repeated,
insistent and wrongful advice by PaineWebber's employee; (2)
the active concealment of and affirmative misstatements about
the risk to his account; (3) his discovery that his losses may
have been caused by the wrongdoing of others; (4) the continu-
ing pattern of wrongdoing with respect to investments from
1982 to 1987; and (5) the continuation of a wrongful brokerage
relation from 1982 to 1987.2
2' 1993 WL 331933, at *2.
12 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348
(1944).
s 984 F.2d 1372, 1381 (3d Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 178-86 and accom-
panying text.
24 Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1375. For a description of the underlying facts of the
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Responding to HofInann's argument, the court stated that
the court should, as a benchmark, generally accept a party's state-
ment as to what constitutes a cause of action and permit the arbi-
tration of that claim as long as the asserted cause of action is not
clearly a mere tolling or discovery argument. However, when the
stated cause of action is patently nothing more than an attempt to
toll the six year period, the court must enjoin the arbitration of that
claim.'
As an example of this analysis, the court explained how it
would apply to the facts of the case:
[C]onsider Hofinann's claim that PaineWebber actively concealed [its
employee's] wrongdoing. This claim easily could be viewed as an at-
tempt to toll the time period on claims arising out of [its employee's]
underlying wrongdoing. At the same time, however, this can also be
viewed as an independent cause of action based on a duty owed by
PaineWebber to its customers to inform them of a broker's wrongdo-
ing or of the unsuitably speculative nature of their investments.
Whether PaineWebber in fact owes such a duty to its customers is a
merits question that must be left to the arbitrators. In this type of
situation, the court must assume for the purposes of determining
arbitrability that such a duty is owed.F'
Hofmann, however, admonished judges to not give carte
blanche to a potential claimant to submit any claim it asserts
as a separate cause of action.' To avoid this problem, courts
must analyze each claim individually to determine whether it
can be said to constitute a separate cause of action.' For in-
stance, the Hofmann court found that the plaintiffs claim of a
separate cause of action was nothing more than a pure discov-
ery argument.'
The Hofmann test not only avoids the disposition of a
claim on its merits, it also leaves the issue of arbitrability to
the judiciary. In addition, this position does not contradict the
time-bar rules in their present version: these rules provide
that they "shall not apply to any case which is directed to
arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction.' Addition-
Hofmann case, see supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
R2 Hofnann, 984 F.2d at 1381.
I' d.
227 Id. at 1381-82.
12 Id. at 1382.
2d.
'2 See, e.g., NASD MANUAL (CCH) q 3715 (1994); NYSE GUIDE (CCO) 9 2603
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ally, the Hofmann test allows courts to weigh the federal policy
favoring arbitration and its finality against the policy behind a
particular statute of limitations. For example, some causes of
action have longer limitations periods because of a strong poli-
cy to deter wrongdoers. The Hofmann court's "separate cause
of action" theory balances these policies without considering
the merits of the claim. Therefore, courts do not need to view
the facts of the case to decide whether a particular claim calls
for an extension of a pertinent limitations period. Generally
speaking, the Hofmann approach seems the most reasonable
resolution of the conflicts caused by the time-bar rules."'
III. THE NASD PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 15:
AN ULTIMATE SOLUTION OR FURTHER AGGRAVATION?
Courts' conflicting interpretations of the time-bar provi-
sions have resulted in a great deal of confusion. Although
Hofmann provides a workable solution, unfortunately the posi-
tion of the Hofmann court represents the minority view. In an
attempt to resolve the controversy and avoid excessive litiga-
tion, the NASD has proposed a series of amendments to Rule
15 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure.
The first such proposal, which was submitted on October
26, 1993, would add two provisions to section 15. 2 Its provi-
sions would empower the Director of Arbitration to make a
final, non-appealable determination of arbitrability of a claim
under the six-year time-bar.' The proposed section would be
entitled 'Eligibility," instead of "Time Limitation on Submis-
sion," to make its jurisdictional nature clear.'
Soon after the first proposal's introduction, SEC staff ques-
tioned the procedure for the eligibility determinationY5
(1992); AMEx GUIDE (CCH) 9544(a).
2"1 Another solution would require scrapping these provisions altogether. For
example, the American Bar Association does not impose any time-limitations on
the submission of claims. See supra note 3. This solution is not very likely, howev-
er, because the SROs apparently want to keep these provisions to regulate the
caseload pressure on their arbitration forums. As to the compulsory elimination of
these provisions, there are no grounds on which courts might strike them down,
nor are courts willing to do so.
22 See First Proposal, supra note 8.
First Proposal supra note 8, 1993 WL 441275 at *3.
First Proposal supra note 8, 1993 WL 441275 at *3.
' Letters from Ethan Corey, Staff Attorney, Over-the-Counter Regulation, SEC
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Therefore, in July 1994, the NASD modified its proposal and
offered the second version of the amendments to section 15.'
to Suzanne Rothwell, Associate General Counsel, NASD (Jan. 31, 1994) and to
Eliott Curzon, Senior Attorney, NASD (Feb. 4, 1994), cited in Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34,442, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,373, at 39,377 (Aug. 2, 1994).
" See Second Proposal, supra note 8. Under the Second Proposal, the new
section 15 will provide:
(a) No dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission
to arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the
occurrence or event giving rise to the [act or] dispute, claim or controver-
sy. This section shall not extend or limit applicable statutes of limita-
tions.
(b) After the filing of a statement of claim, counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party claim (hereinafter 'claim") pursuant to Section 13 or 25 of
the Code, the Director of Arbitration shall determine if the claim is eligi-
ble for submission to arbitration by determining if the claim alleges that
less than six (6) years have elapsed between the occurrence or event
giving rise to the dispute, claim or controversy and filing of the claim. If
the claim does not state clearly that less than six (6) years have elapsed
between the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute, claim or con-
troversy and filing, the Director may ask the claimant to modify the
claim, within a time period set by the Director, to so state. The Director
will determine the eligibility of the claim for submission to arbitration
either on the basis of the claim as stated in the original claim or, if
modified, on the basis of the modified claim.
(c) Following service of a claim, but prior to the earlier of (1) the
date the parties are notified of the appointment of the arbitrators pursu-
ant to Sections 13 or 19 of the Code, or (2) the date the Director ap-
points an arbitrator to consider prehearing issues pursuant to Section
32(e) of the Code, a responding party disputing the eligibility of a claim
shall, along with, or after, submitting an executed Uniform Submission
Agreement and any fees or deposits required under the Code, submit a
notice of objection to the Director of Arbitration supported by statements
of fact and documentary evidence asserting that more than six (6) years
have elapsed between the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute,
claim or controversy and filing. The claimant and any other party may
respond to the notice of objection within the time period set by the Di-
rector. The Director shall promptly determine on the basis of the written
record only, after considering any responses timely submitted, if the
claim is eligible for submission to arbitration by determining if the dis-
puting party's objections and assertions regarding eligibility: (i) contradict
the allegations in the claim relating to eligibility; (ii) are supported by
documentary evidence; and, (iii) are not contradicted by other allegations
which, if true, would prevail.
(d) Any determination by the Director pursuant to subparagraph (b)
or (c) is final.
(e) Any determination by the Director pursuant to subparagraph Wb)
or c) that a claim is ineligible: (i) shall not limit the right of any party
to offer evidence concerning the event or occurrence which was the basis
of the eligibility determination at any other stage of the proceeding on
the claim for any purpose other than contesting the eligibility of the
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The new proposal added six new subsections and gave the
Director of Arbitration the authority to determine whether less
than six years had elapsed between the occurrence or event
giving rise to a dispute 7 As in the first proposal, the
Director's decision would be final.' The proposal also de-
scribed the procedure used by the Director to determine the
claim's eligibility for arbitration. Pursuant to this procedure,
the Director determines the timeliness of a claim on the basis
of a statement of claim. 9 A respondent who disputes eligi-
bility must submit to the Director a notice of objection sup-
ported by statements of fact and documentary evidence assert-
ing that more than six years have elapsed between the occur-
rence or event giving rise to the controversy and filing.240
Based only on the written record, the Director will then deter-
mine the eligibility of the claim to arbitration.24
Citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Work-
ers of America,242 the NASD stated in its proposal that its
purpose was to make plain the intention of the parties to an
arbitration agreement (which incorporates by reference all the
provisions of the Code) to have the Director decide the issue of
eligibility.243 To strengthen the finality and absolute power of
the Director's eligibility decision, the second version of section
15 deletes the statement of inapplicability of the rule to claims
referred to arbitration by a court.2" Generally, the second
claim determined to be ineligible; (ii) shall not bar a claimant from
bringing the claim before a judicial forum, notwithstanding any existing
predispute arbitration agreement; (iii) shall not affect the rights and
remedies of the claimant with respect to such claim, notwithstanding any
existing predispute arbitration agreement; and, (iv) shall mean that the
limitation period on eligibility set forth in Subsection (a) shall continue to
run as though the claim had never been filed.
(f) Any determination by the Director relating to eligibility shall set forth
in writing the occurrence or event that was the basis for the determina-
tion.
(g) No party shall seek to enforce any agreement to arbitrate if the claim
has been determined to be ineligible under this Section.
Id. at 39,373-74.
Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,374.
Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,376.
29 Second Proposal, supra note 8, § 15(b), at 39,373.
240 Second Proposal, supra note 8, § 15(c), at 39,373.
"' Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,375 n.6 (NASD commentaries).
2 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,374.
The present version of section 15 provides that "[t]his section shall not ...
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proposal differs from the first only with respect to the proce-
dural details of eligibility determination.
Some commentators have expressed concern that the new
rule contradicts various court holdings.24 In response, the
NASD, relying on AT&T Technologies, claimed that
"[airbitration is a creature of contract,... and it is for the
parties to determine the terms of the contract." 46 The NASD
also stated that the tolling doctrine "historically" is inapplica-
ble to the eligibility rule.247 At the same time, in the exam-
ples set forth in the Comments to the Rule, the Association
tacitly admitted that fraudulent concealment would affect the
timeliness of a claim.24 The NASD also claimed that the new
rule would not create a burden on competition.249 As to the
rights of the parties, the NASD argued that the arbitration fo-
rum has an inherent right to limit access to itself,"0 but this
in no way affects a party's right to seek any remedy in the
courts." Interestingly, the rule also provides innovative po-
lice measures for use against members who try to compel arbi-
tration after the claim has been determined ineligible. 2
Under the proposal a member would be prohibited from seek-
ing an alternative forum and would be subjected to a disciplin-
ary action in a case of non-compliance.'
The apparent goal of the new rule is to reduce the amount
of litigation and to create uniformity in the enforcement of the
apply to any case which is directed to arbitration by a court of competent juris-
diction." NASD ANUAL (CC) I 3715.
u" Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,378 & n.17 (referring to commentaries
by Gregory L. Wilmes and Michael E. Friedman).
" Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,378.
' Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,378.
u Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,375-76. ("An allegation that the account
statement is fraudulent would be sufficient to overcome the disputing party's alle-
gation [of ineligibility] . . . Therefore the proposed rule establishes a presumption
in favor of the eligibility . . . ")
' Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,376. Although this statement is a re-
quired formality, it received a special meaning in the context of this Proposal,
which, in fact, does create a burden on competition. See supra note 261 and ac-
companying text.
23 Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,377.
2 Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,376 ("a determination that a claim is
ineligible will not ... bar a claimant from bringing the substantive claim before a
judicial forum").
22 See Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,376.
Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,376.
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six-year eligibility requirement. The proposal suffers from a
number of flaws, however. First, it specifically indicates that
the six-year period is a substantive, not procedural, bar to
arbitration.' If so, the rule does, in fact, contradict the hold-
ings of most courts."5 All of the "substantive" circuits have
held that the eligibility issue is for a court to decide." In
this respect, the NASD's reading of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in AT&T Technologies is not entirely correct: AT&T Tech-
nologies held that "the question of arbitrability... is undeni-
ably an issue for judicial determination." 7 The AT&T Court
emphasized that "clear and unmistakable" agreement of the
parties should be determined by the judiciary, not by arbitra-
tion forums,2 8 and the courts that regard section 15 to be a
substantive bar to the submission to arbitration have inter-
preted it as such. Furthermore, establishing that an investor
clearly and unmistakably has intended to delegate eligibility
determinations to the Director of Arbitration is difficult, since
such eligibility determination is incorporated in the agreement
by general reference to the Code, and presumably, most inves-
tors are unaware of the intricacies of the CodeY59
Second, application of the Rule to a claim controlled by
different statutes of limitations poses a very difficult question
that is unlikely to be resolved by the Director. Equitable doc-
trines supposedly are inapplicable to the six-year limitation
period of section 15. The Hofmann approach is the only way to
avoid potential conflict with the limitations periods governing
"' Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,375 ("These changes are intended to
further clarify the distinction between issues related to eligibility . . . and statutes
of limitations. . . .)
Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,378.
2 See supra notes 154-95 and accompanying text.
"z AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)
255 Id.
"9 The court in Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrels, 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1992) stated:
NASD Code Section 35 does provide that the "arbitrators shall be em-
powered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions
under the Code which interpretation shall be final and binding upon the
parties." However, we do not believe that this provision is a clear and
unmistakable expression of the parties' intent to have the arbitrators,
and not the court, determine which disputes the parties have agreed to
submit to arbitration.
Id. at 514, n.6.
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an underlying claim."' Yet this approach envisions joint par-
ticipation by courts and arbitrators: the courts make a prelimi-
nary determination whether a separate cause of action doctrine
might apply, and then the arbitrators decide whether the facts
of this particular case require them to use an accrual point
other than the date of an original transaction. Under the pro-
posed section 15, this analysis would be done by neither courts
nor arbitrators.
Third, the claim that the rule does not impose an unfair
burden on competition is not very persuasive." Usually, the
"Burden on Competition" statement is a mere formality re-
quired for any rule change proposed by the SROs. In the con-
text of this Proposal, however, the statement sounds like a
distortion of reality. The codes of other SROs still contain the
older version of the rule, subject to existing precedent, and
there is no indication that they are going to amend it in the
immediate future. Therefore, the parties to arbitration in fo-
rums other than the NASD will enjoy judicial determination of
the arbitrability of their claim (at least in "substantive" juris-
dictions), whereas the disputants in the NASD forum will have
to be satisfied by the pronouncements of the Director of Arbi-
tration. Thus, the new Proposal does in fact create a burden on
competition by encouraging arbitration forum shopping.
Fourth, the Director's determination of ineligibility will
totally bar a party from seeking a remedy in the courts in
almost all jurisdictions. While an arbitration forum has a right
to limit access to itself,2' application of these provisions ne-
glects what makes securities arbitration forums different from
other ADR institutions. Given the mandatory nature of arbi-
tration for most securities claims and the unavailability of a
recourse in the courts for ineligible claims, the SROs' arbitra-
tion forums have become quasi-judicial bodies rather than
voluntary alternatives to litigation. Under such circumstances,
limitation of access to the forum would be more like a depriva-
tion of parties' rights to adjudicate their disputes.
Arguably, courts also limit access to judicial forums by
2o See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
2S See supra note 249.
' See supra note 113.
Second Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,377.
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barring stale claims from adjudication. There is, however, a
difference. Judicial determination of eligibility is made in a
forum which is constitutionally empowered with adjudicatory
functions. Moreover, judicial orders are subject to appellate
review, which substantially lessens the possibility of mistake.
In contrast, under the proposed rule the Director of Arbitration
alone would make a crucial determination without the safe-
guard of appellate review. The lack of appellate review is espe-
cially dangerous because the Director is not an impartial adju-
dicator. Such circumstances, considering the fact that an inel-
igibility verdict would be the end of a claim, provide ample
opportunity for abuse. The likelihood of abuse also is increased
by the fact that an aggrieved party who is a NASD member
would risk loss of membership and consequently employment
by deciding to fight a potentially unfair or biased determina-
tion. Although due process challenge to securities arbitration
thus far have been unsuccessful,2 the new rule could change
this situation.
Undoubtedly, courts could disregard the Director's powers
to determine eligibility and make their own determination. For
example, because the NASD does not require the Director to be
an attorney,265 the Director possibly could disregard existing
law and determine the eligibility of a claim based on her own
understanding of the subject. If the Director merely misapplied
the law, such a determination will not be subject to judicial
reversal. 6 If, however, a court finds that the Director mani-
festly disregarded the law, it must vacate the determina-
tion.267 Under such circumstances, the NASD's claim that the
"' See, e.g., Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 186 (7th Cir. 1984)
(while recognizing that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was heavily regulated by
the federal government, such regulation was insufficient to make the Exchange a
de facto agent of the government for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment); R.J. O'Brien Assoc., Inc. v. Pipkin, No. 93C-3154, 1994 WL
96649, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 1994) (except for ensuring that the protections of
the FAA are satisfied, the government itself is indifferent to the resolution of this
particular dispute between the parties); Rubin v. NYSE, Civ. A. No. 91-6604, 1992
WL 131154 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1992).
266 Although the present NASD Director of Arbitration, Deborah Masucci, is an
attorney, the NASD Rules, just like the rules of other SROs, do not require that
the Director hold a legal degree.
2161 See Miller v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989)
("federal courts have consistently held that they will not set aside an arbitrator's
award for mere errors in law") (citation omitted).
262 See Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d
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Director's decision is final will conflict directly with a court's
holding, and the NASD would have to disobey a judicial order
and deny a claim referred to it by the court. This scenario is
not unthinkable under the new rule considering the controver-
sy among the courts as to the eligibility determination.
Finally, the withdrawal of eligibility determination from
the courts will eradicate the precedent-generating system.
Currently, the rules governing limitations periods in securities
laws are not well-settled. Therefore, any new pronouncement
on the subject has great precedential value. The detriment to
common law will far outweigh any benefits to efficiency and
expediency of the process."s
So far, only one court, the Southern District of New York
in Castellano v. Prudential-Bache Securities," has consid-
ered whether it is appropriate for the Director of Arbitration of
the New York Stock Exchange to determine the issue of the
eligibility under the NYSE six-year rule. The plaintiff in
Castellano argued that limitations questions should have been
determined by a panel of three arbitrators and not by the Di-
rector, whose responsibilities are limited by Rule 6 3 5 " to
ministerial duties. 1 The court rejected this argument, stat-
ing as its sole reason the court's deference to the New York
Stock Exchange."
Nevertheless, this case does not indicate a general judicial
approval of the proposed amendments to the NASD CAP Sec-
tion 15. The district court that decided Castellano followed the
Conticommodity rule and generally considered timeliness is-
sues to be the province of an arbitration forum. As noted
above, the Conticommodity analysis contradicts the Supreme
Cir. 1986) (manifest disregard of the law is a ground for vacating an arbitration
award).
"' For a discussion of the problem of generating a precedent in the securities
industry, which is subjected to virtually mandatory arbitration, reo generally
Idpton, supra note 105 (arguing that arbitration leads to a malnourishment of
common law and calling for modification of the arbitration system).
"9 [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 95,321 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1990).
2o NYSE Code of Arbitration Rule 635 provides, in pertinent part ' ha Direc-
tor of Arbitration shall be charged with the duty to perform all ministerial duties
in connection with the matters submitted for arbitration pursuant to these Rules.!
NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 9I 2635 (1992).
2" Castellano, at 96,536.
272 Id.
1995]
BROOKLYN LAWREVWEW
Court holding in AT&T Technologies, as well as the NASD's
own statement that Section 15 is a substantive rather than a
procedural provision. Moreover, the Castellano court implied
that it did not approve of the NYSE approach but would up-
hold the delegation to the Director of the issues of eligibility
under Rule 603 because of the court's general deference to the
arbitration forums.13 It is unlikely that a "substantive" court
would be as deferential to the arbitration forum when faced
with the same case.
This analysis equally applies to the NASD Code of Arbitra-
tion. Section 3, entitled "Director of Arbitration," has a slightly
different wording from NYSE Rule 635. It provides in perti-
nent part that the Director of Arbitration shall perform all
"administrative duties and functions" in connection with NASD
arbitration mattersY4 Although the NASD Director of Arbi-
tration, unlike her NYSE counterpart, is empowered to carry
out "all administrative" duties rather than simply those "min-
isterial" ones, the determination of limitations questions clear-
ly is no more administrative than ministerial.
Furthermore, the new rule does not effectively deter exces-
sive litigation. Consider two scenarios that exemplify situa-
tions where the determination could be challenged in courts.
First, in the case of a dissatisfied broker, NASD members are
at risk of facing disciplinary sanctions if they challenge the
Director's determination. When an allegedly defrauded investor
brings a claim against the broker, however, the matter may
273 "Whenever [sic] may be the Court's view as to whether the determination of
limitations questions is merely ministerial, Rule 603 allows for the NYSE's inter-
pretation." Castellano, [1990 Transfer Branch] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. J 95,321, at
96,536.
2'4 NASD MANUAL (CCH) 3703 (1994).
The Board of Governors of the Association shall appoint a Director of
Arbitration who shall be charged with the performance of all administra-
tive duties and functions in connection with matters submitted for arbi-
tration pursuant to this Code. He shall be directly responsible to the
National Arbitration Committee and shall report to it at periodic inter-
vals established by the Committee and at such other times as called
upon by the Committee to do so.
Id. (emphasis added). The Proposal also contains an amended version of this sec-
tion. However, these amendments relate to the delegation of the Director's duties
to her appointee and to the matters related to the appointment of the Director.
The part that presents a special interest for this Note-the section that describes
the Director's duties as "adminitrative'--was left unchanged.
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first go to a court on a motion to either compel or enjoin the
arbitration. The parties then may litigate the issue of eligibili-
ty as a threshold question without running a risk of being
penalized by the NASD. 5 Even if this strategy fails," the
award still is subject to collateral challenge under section 16 of
the Arbitration Act. 7 Therefore, after the arbitration pro-
ceedings, a broker can return to court and challenge the award
on the ground that the arbitrators lacked subject-matter juris-
diction and the court should not have compelled arbitra-
tion."8 The Sorrells case, in which the court vacated an oth-
erwise valid arbitration award after finding the claim was
outside the six-year time limit, perfectly illustrates this situa-
tionY
9
Second, consider the case of the Dissatisfied Investor. The
threat of disciplinary sanctions for disobedience to the
Director's determination does not apply to the investor. There-
fore, the investor can always challenge the timeliness determi-
nation in court on the ground of unconscionability of the arbi-
tration agreement. An investor could succeed in this challenge
if a court finds unequal bargaining power, lack of knowledge of
all the pertinent provisions of the Code incorporated into the
agreement by reference, or that the arbitration agreement is
pre-printed and therefore constitutes an inseparable part of a
standard Customer Agreement.' 0 Indeed, the Supreme Court
2" Indeed, the member who challenges the eligibility of a claim does not violate
the proposed section 15. Since the matter first goes before a court, the Director
does not have a chance to make any determination.
2" According to the new rule, even if the matter is referred to arbitration by
the court, the eligibility determination still is to be made by the Director. Second
Proposal, supra note 8, at 39,375 ("a court order directing the parties to arbitra-
tion is not a determination that the matter is eligible for arbitration under the
rules of the NASD").
2" For the effects of collateral challenges on awards, see the discussion supra
note 48.
21" Once again, the NASD member does not violate the finality provisions of
section 15. In this latter scenario, a broker challenges not the Director's determi-
nation but the award as a whole under the authority of section 16 of the Arbitra-
tion Act.
2" Edward D. Jones v. Sorrels & Co., 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains that "gross inequality of
bargaining power," may trigger the presumption of unconscionability. RESTATFMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRAarS § 208 cmt. d (1981). One of the factors that contributes
to such a conclusion is "knowledge of the stronger party [m our case the broker-
dealer] that the weaker party [investox is unable reasonably to protect his inter-
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in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon acknowledged
that, notwithstanding the federal policy favoring arbitration,
courts would entertain a "well-grounded claim that an arbitra-
tion agreement resulted from... excessive economic power"
and consider it a basis for invalidating such agreement. 1
Most of the lower courts that have dealt with unconscionability
challenges to arbitration agreements have not allowed claim-
ants to overcome the clear federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion. 2 The proposed new NASD Rule presents a different
case, however. Under the proposed rule, a potential claimant
would not be trying to invalidate an arbitration agreement per
se but rather would ask the court to sever the unconscionable
portion -- the mandatory eligibility determination by the
Director.'
In sum, the proposed rule, if adopted, will create more
problems than solutions and may result in a proliferation of
ests by reason of ... ignorance, . . .or inability to understand the language of
the agreement . . . " Id. The Restatement also provides that not necessarily the
whole contract but only some of its terms may be unconscionable, and such an
unconscionable clause may be stricken or limited, without destroying the whole
contract. Id. § 208 cmt. e.
23' 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)). The Rodriguez opinion reiterates much
of the same language, which derives from Mitsubishi, but does not further develop
the law on the issue. See Rodriguez de Qujas v. Shearson/American Express, 490
U.S. 477 (1989). It merely concludes that "[allthough petitioners suggest that the
agreement to arbitrate here was adhesive in nature, the record contains no factual
showing sufficient to support that suggestion." Id. at 484.
' See, e.g., Adams v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 888 F.2d 696,
700 (10th Cir. 1989) (rejecting investors' argument that the arbitration agreement
should not be enforced because it was a "form, boilerplated contract, drafted by
Merrill Lynch, whose agents made no attempt to highlight the arbitration provi-
sion"); Dale v. Prudential Bache Sec., 719 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(lack of ability to understand the arbitration agreement is not sufficient to find
such agreement unconscionable).
' As discussed supra note 280, it is not necessary that the whole contract be
stricken down. An unconscionable clause may be stricken or limited, without do-
strying the whole contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 & cmt e.
2 "The courts have consistently held that arbitration agreements are not un-
conscionable as a matter of law." Theodore A. Krebsbach & George H. Friedman,
Arbitral Forum, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION UPDATE 3, 19 (M. Fitterman & T.
Krebsbach eds., 1989) Courts, however, "are reluctant to find adhesion clauses en-
forceable, particularly if it is also 'unduly oppressive, unconscionable or otherwise
against public policy.'" Consequently, the courts are an important ally of investor.
customers in brokerage cases and may find the clause enforceable. Grant, supra
note 70, at 453-54.
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litigation. The better response to the increasing litigation of
the six-year time-bars is to withdraw the proposal. The NASD
instead may issue an official interpretation explaining that it
intends the six-year time bar to be a substantive, eligibility
provision.' Section 15 should be left unchanged in all other
respects, including the clause allowing courts to refer a case to
arbitration, notwithstanding the six-year bar. The application
of the rule would then be a task for the courts, which ideally
would apply the Hofmnn test.
CONCLUSION
Despite the antagonism between arbitration time-bars and
statutes of limitations, these mechanisms will continue to
serve as safety valves regulating the caseload pressure on
arbitration forums by creating additional limitations on arbi-
tration claims. The potential conflict can be avoided only by
giving courts, not arbitration forums, the power to determine
the timeliness of the claim under the time-bar rules. In this re-
spect, the new time-bar rule proposed by the NASD is trouble-
some from a theoretical perspective and impractical for pre-
venting excessive litigation. As this Note demonstrates, a party
who is dissatisfied with the Director's determination easily can
find a way to challenge the Director's 'Imal" determination in
court. It would be better therefore to leave the determination
of eligibility to the courts, which may intervene regardless of
the NASD rules. These proceedings would not be too burden-
some and may be conducted summarily to use judicial resourc-
es efficiently.
Allowing courts to resolve timeliness issues is just the first
part of the problem. The second and perhaps even more impor-
tant issue concerns how courts will approach the timeliness for
's The NASD often issues similar interpretations of its various rules by the
Board of Governors. See, e.g., the interpretations of the Board of Governors to the
Rules of Fair Practice. These interpretations are binding on NASD members and
are usually taken into account by courts and the SEC.
See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
27 Under the Hofmann approach, courts do not need and may not examine the
factual records. They will only have to deal with a statement of claim to decide
whether it alleges a "separate cause of action" theory as opposed to a mere tolling
argument. The factual issues will be left for the arbitration panel to decide.
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submission of a claim to arbitration. The best approach is
offered by PaineWebber Inc. v. HofmannY The Hoffman ap-
proach allows a court to decide whether a claim alleges a sepa-
rate cause of action, such as a breach of a duty to not conceal
the wrong, or merely offers an equitable tolling argument. In
the latter case, the claim will be dismissed as untimely, while
in the former, the claim will be compelled to arbitration. Under
this approach, courts disregard the merits of the case, leaving
the disposition of factual disputes to arbitrators who may well
dismiss any claim as untimely if its facts do not give rise to a
separate cause of action.
In such settings, arbitrators will decide a procedural part
of the issue-the limitations defense-whereas the courts will
address the jurisdictional questions. This symbiosis provides
for the best possible allocation of adjudicatory functions be-
tween the courts and arbitrators, and complies with the re-
quirements of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Another advantage of the Hofmann analysis is that it
allows courts to balance the policies behind the time-bar provi-
sions (designed to limit stale arbitration claims) against the
deterrence policies that may be a predicate of an underlying
claim. Thus, an application of the arbitration time-bars will
not be a mechanical computation and will best serve public
policy.
Despite all the advantages of the Hofmann analysis, such
an approach is impossible under the NASD proposal. If the
rule is adopted, the timeliness question will be removed com-
pletely from the courts. Moreover, even an arbitration panel
will be excluded. Thus, the determination of the timeliness of a
claim will depend solely on the Director's discretion, and will
not be subject to any appellate review. It is unlikely that any
Director, no matter how qualified and diligent, can successfully
cope with this enormous task.
Although the NASD, in proposing the new rule, was driven
by the desirable goal of advancing the basic ingredient and
major virtue of arbitration-the principle of finality and effi-
ciency-the threshold question of eligibility should be decided
by courts. In the long run, such a determination will make the
28 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993).
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arbitration process more efficient and will give additional
weight to the arbitration award.
Emil Bukhmae
' The author wishes to thank Professor Norman S. Poser for his invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this Note.

